Report of the regional seminar for Southern and East Africa
I. Introduction
The first regional meeting in support of the universalisation of theEight regional States not party to the BTWC were represented: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia.
Two regional BTWC States Parties were represented: Kenya and Uganda
Representatives from Eight International and Regional Organisations participated: African Union; European Union – Commission; European Union – Institute for International Studies; Inter-Governmental Authority on Development; International Committee of the Red Cross, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs; World Health Organisation; and World Organisation for Animal Health.
Eight EU Member States were represented: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
II. Meeting proceedings
A. Introductions
Ambassador Roland Hauser (Austria; Presidency of the European Union) welcomed the participants and introduced the goals of the European Union (EU) with regard to the disarmament and non-proliferation of biological weapons (BW).Mr Moses Wetangula, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, next welcomed the participants. He emphasized the importance of the BTWC of Southern and East Africa, and the need for all States in the region to adhere to it. He highlighted the efforts to promote peace and security Kenya undertakes in bilateral settings and regional and sub-regional forums. He also appealed to engage Somalia in the BTWC universalisation process despite the current internal instability.
B. Summary of presentations
Ms Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU Member States and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Mr Javier Solana, and thanked the United Nations for the logistical support and assistant Minister Wetangula for the Kenyan assistance to the regional seminar.The motivation for the first regional seminal in support of the universalisation of the BTWC is rooted in the EU’s Security Strategy and the Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both documents are based on three principles, namely effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation, and partnership. The effective multilateralism is reflected in the EU’s political and financial contribution to efforts to universalise the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the BTWC. In trying to prevent threats from emerging, the EU seeks to address the complexities and root causes of threats and risks. In the case of the BW threat, the EU contribution is multifaceted and combines many policy tools. With regard to the strengthening of the BTWC, it involves cooperation with other states and international organisations, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) in combatting infectious and non-infectious diseases, and in areas like dual-use export controls and technical assistance to border control and monitoring, training of customs officers, and so on. Under the principle of cooperation and partnership, the EU has developed a number of regional strategies, including ‘The EU and Africa: Towards the Strategic Partnership’, adopted in December 2005. Another example is the so-called ‘non-proliferation clause’, which the EU inserts in all cooperation and assistance agreements with Third World countries as a confidence-building measure and an opportunity to engage in a wider security dialogue on the root causes of regional instability.
The EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC, of which the regional seminar in Nairobi is a part, has a double objective. First, it aims to raise awareness about the importance of BTWC universality. It encourages States that have signed the BTWC before its entry into force in 1975 to ratify it and non-signatory States to accede to Convention. Second, the EU is prepared to offer legal or legislative implementation assistance to 12 States Party to the BTWC that request such assistance. It is the intention to request the EU Member States to expand this second component in order to be able to provide a similar type of assistance to countries that are in the process of ratifying or acceding to the BTWC.
By way of conclusion, an appeal to participate as a member or an observer in the upcoming Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 20 November–8 December) to the States not yet party to the BTWC was formulated.
Ms Giannella also assured Assistant Minister Wetangula that it is the intention to engage Somalia withing the framework of the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC, explaining that at the time the invitations were being issued it was impossible to obtain a relevant contact point within the government as a consequence of the country’s political instability.
Dr May Chu, BioRisk Reduction for Dangerous Pathogens Team, WHO, outlined the preparations the WHO has undertaken to counter public health emergencies of international concern. Since 2002, the WHO has the mandate to mount a global public health response to the natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radiological materials that affect health. As part of this mandate it has set up a major campaign to raise awareness about the importance of health research and the risks posed by the misuse of valuable research and materials. Among the activities are the publication of books, fact sheets on select biological agents, and the establishment of global networks of experts and laboratories, information dissemination procedures, and programmes related to training and quality assurance. The WHO is implementing a national pandemic preparedness programme that builds on a regionally implemented strategy for strengthening national early warning and response systems. The result is a rapid increase of the number of countries with plans or plans in preparation. The WHO has also created a network on the deliberate use of chemical and biological agents, and interacts with many other international organisations to address this particular threat.
With regard to the biological threat, the WHO runs a ‘national preparedness assessment’ programme offering advice and may initiate a public health response to an attack, but it is not involved in detection nor in the determination of the origin of the attack.
Mr Helmut Walerius of the Health Threat Unit in the European Commission described the EU approach to biological threats to public health. The EU has set up several programmes, systems and networks to deal with epidemiological events or cases of the deliberate uses of chemical or biological agents. Since May 2005 the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is operational. The EU runs a Programme of Cooperation in Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Public Health). The European Commission also supports a number of research programmes to develop technologies and knowledge related to health security.
Dr Gideon Brückner, Head of the Scientific and Technical Department of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), focussed on the threat to animal health, and the OIE’s work plan, which includes information dissemination, the development and implementation of standards, prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases, capacity building for National Veterinary Services, and exerting influence on policies related to animal health and welfare. The threat from animal diseases is great, as the diseases can now spread faster across the world than the average incubation period of most diseases. Such outbreaks have high economic and social consequences, and contribute to the loss of livelihoods and increase in poverty. Sixty percent of animal pathogens have a potential for bioterrorist use.
The OIE has undertaken a number of initiatives to establish early warning and detection systems, rapid notification mechanisms and rapid response systems. It invests in the improvement of governance and veterinary policies, capacity building, and the establishment of quality centres for support to countries. In the short term, its priorities are on infected and high-risk countries; in the long term the needs of all developing countries and countries in transition will be addressed.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project and entrusted with the technical implementation of the EU Joint Action, offered a brief summary of the BTWC and the current status of the norm against BW. Worldwide, the BTWC has 155 States Parties. Thirty-nine States still remain outside the convention. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is the most under-represented part of the world: out of a total of 47 States, 19 (or 40%) are not party to the BTWC. The Southern and East African region has the largest share of non-States Parties (11 out of 19, or 58%).
Ms Angela Woodward, Legal Coordinator at the Bioweapons Prevention Project for possible assistance programmes under the EU Joint Action, summarized the obligations States Parties to the BTWC assume in order to translate the prohibitions in the convention into national legislation. She also highlighted the legal and legislative implementation assistance the EU can make available to States Party to the BTWC that request such assistance.
Discussion
The representatives from the States not party to the BTWC welcomed the initiative to hold a 2-day seminar. A central theme of their interventions was the lack of awareness about the BTWC and background information related to the treaty implementation and the BW threat. Several factors were identified, including the widespread instability in the region and the fact that several countries had not yet achieved independence at the time of the entry into force of the BTWC. In general, the representatives noted that it was imperative to provide their countries with information about the treaty and its requirements.
Another factor is the high number of security conventions that require ratification and implementation. This places a high resource burden on the administration of those countries.
The absence of an international organisation to oversee the implementation of the BTWC like the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was perceived as an important contributing factor to the low number of ratifications. The OPCW has several outreach and support programmes. It was noted that the absence of an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons also complicates the implementation of support programmes like the EU Joint Action.
The debate also highlighted that the target states are aware of the cross-border dimension of the biological threat, whether natural or deliberate.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders described the security challenges posed by BW to Southern and East Africa. There have been few cases of biological warfare. Most of the attacks involving pathogens or toxins have been acts of sabotage in war, assassination operations or criminal acts. Only the global disease burden can give an indication of the potential impact of deliberate disease on a society: One quarter of all deaths worldwide and one half of the deaths in the developing world are attributable to infectious disease. In addition, a biological attack would have economic and social consequences that reach far beyond the numbers of human casualties.
Southern and East Africa was recently the victim of mass-casualty terrorism. During the past decades there have also been several confirmed and alleged attacks involving pathogens in the region, implying that the threat should not just be a concern of Europe and the United States. Furthermore, over 50% of the pathogens that are endemic in Southern and Eastern Africa have research as potential BW.
The presentation concluded with an overview of how the BTWC can contribute to the reduction of the BW threat, improve national health security (including with regard to natural diseases), and open opportunities for international cooperation.
Dr René Bessin, Animal Health Officer, Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources, African Union and Coordinator of the Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE) emphasized by that it is absolutely necessary to build and support national capabilities to deal with epidemics like Ebola and AIDS.
Discussion
The threat assessment provoked a discussion as to whether this type of analysis creates fear or contributes to raising awareness. It was emphasized that the outbreaks of disease can occur naturally or by intent. Therefore, the first task is to set up a policy of health security, which includes knowledge about what to do in the case of an incident. The sharing of information is critical to stop an outbreak as closely to the source as possible. A principle is to know the neighbours well and to set cooperative mechanisms in place to deal with an outbreak.
Another question addressed in the discussion concerned the prevention of terrorists having access to harmful biological materials. The ease of crossing borders in the region is another factor complicating the ability of states to deal with the threat. It was noted that the transboundary movement of diseases is a major problem under any circumstances. The OIE has a programme to assists states in improving border controls.
A final issue concerned information about dual-use items that need to be controlled. The BTWC does not contain lists with threat agents or laboratory and production equipment, but such information can be obtained form the control list maintained by the Australia Group.
Mr Leonard Blazeby, Communications Co-ordinator, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC-Nairobi), outlined the obligations of States under the BTWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. There is increased concern that the advances in biotechnology can be used to improve the acquisition and the use of biological weapons. In addition, the threat of deliberate use of disease is no longer limited to states as an expanding range of people have access to such agents. The BTWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 offer a number of tools to prevent the misuse of biology and biotechnology. National implementation legislation domesticates the prohibitions of the BTWC. UNSC Resolution 1540 focusses more specifically on the criminalisation of the illicit use of pathogens and dual-use equipment, and orders all states to develop and maintain border controls and other areas of law enforcement to combat illicit transfers of such items.
Mr Paul Kahigi, a legal expert from Uganda, emphasized the need for international cooperation and assistance in the development of legal tools—including the domestication of the BTWC—to prevent the malicious use of biological agents and offered a list of possible measures. He concluded that the promotion of the biosciences is fundamental to the well-being of people, but that the prevention of its misuse is equally important.
Discussion
The discussion focussed primarily on the involvement of various pan-African and sub-regional international organisations in the development of common norms, standards and criteria.
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York) highlighted the benefits biotechnology can bring with regard to new pharmaceuticals, advances in medicine, agriculture, materials and computing. However, these same advances applied in the military sphere can also contribute to the development of effective designer BW. In addition, since more people in a growing number of disciplines have access to the knowledge and expertise, the risk of misuse of biotechnology also increases. It has become a matter of urgency to understand this risk, and develop ways of dealing with it. The provisions of the BTWC offers a number of tools to reduce the risk of misuse while promoting the legitimate application of biotechnology. As the UN Secretary-General stated in April 2006, ‘the proper antidote to biological weapons threats is the Biological Weapons Convention’.
Mr Helmut Walerius also noted the benefits of biotechnology, but wondered how to ensure its peaceful use. He mentioned the new EU framework programme for research, which will start in 2007. Among other things, it will look at ethical principles for research. In relation to the BTWC he noted that it was critical to acquire the knowledge on how to detect and prevent the misuse of biotechnology.
Discussion
It was suggested that the African states should set up several cooperative programmes among themselves and between individual laboratories in order to prevent the misuse of science and technology. In addition similar arrangements could be established between the developed and developing countries. The States party to the BTWC considered such option during its annual meetings between the 5th Review Conference (2001–02) and the 6th Review Conference (2006). These ideas are to be further developed in the coming years, if it is so decided at the 6th Review Conference.
One representative of a target state referred to the relevance of Article X of the BTWC to developing countries and wondered how it is implemented in practice. The EU sees a clear link between compliance with the BTWC provisions and development. Reference was made to the EU Joint Action in support of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which includes a pillar for providing technical assistance for laboratories. While similar possibilities exist for the BTWC, it is still too early to decide on concrete implementation proposals.
C. Workgroups
On the second day, participants broke up in two working groups to discuss in detail the three themes introduced during the previous afternoon, namely ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’, ‘Obligations under the BTWC and UNSC 1540: International Cooperation and Assistance’, and ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’.Theme 1: ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’
The representatives from the target states were in general agreement that states armed with BW is not the security threat. In contrast, the application of biological and toxin agents by terrorists and particularly criminals were seen as a real threat. This threat is further enhanced by the chronic conflicts and political instability in the region.
Securitising borders emerged as a major concern among the participants. Particularly those states with sea ports were concerned about the ability of terrorists or criminals to bring biological and other materials into the country unnoticed. The participants viewed this as a significant risk not only to their own country, but also to the hinterland. Not being a Party to the BTWC was an important factor that contributed to the threat perception. These States do not have the means—legal tools, border control equipment, expertise, etc.—to address these concerns.
Participants stated that there was already significant regional and sub-regional cooperation to address perceived threats. However, they expressed a wish for greater involvement from outside the region. Besides the need for BTWC implementation and legislation (see also Theme 2), assistance with export and particularly import controls would be welcomed.
The areas where the representatives from the target states would appreciate EU assistance are raising issue awareness both through information activities and demarches by EU Member States, the development of biosecurity and biosafety measures, enhanced laboratory capacity, and building capacity to implement the BTWC. In particular, they would appreciate assistance and capacity building regarding BTWC implementation before their country ratifies or accedes to the convention.
The Comores, Madagascar and Zambia reported that they have already initiated the process to ratify or accede to the BTWC. The process could be completed within the next year.
Theme 2: ‘Obligations under the BTWC and UNSC 1540: International Cooperation and Assistance’
The discussions focussed primarily on opportunities for ratifying or acceding to the BTWC and national implementation legislation. In general, none of the representatives of the target states expected to encounter political impediments to their state joining the treaty. However, there is a need to conduct awareness-raising among a range of national actors to gain the necessary support, in particular among relevant government departments, Cabinets, or Parliamentarians.
Some differences among the target states were nonetheless noted. Signatory states considered that it should not be too difficult to acquire political support for ratification. The act of signature means there is some level of awareness of the treaty in the government, although this will need to be rekindled. States that are already party to the CWC viewed this process being eased by the similarities between the objectives of both treaties. The greatest challenge appears to be for those states that are neither party to the CWC nor the BTWC. Major awareness raising activities would be required.
The national processes for ratification and accession are largely similar among the common law and civil law states. A policy paper outlining recommendations for treaty ratification or accession is tabled to the Cabinet, with final approval from the Executive or Parliament, depending on a state’s constitutional process. Some states require support from other government departments. In addition, states conduct outreach with other national stakeholders, such as the private sector and civil society, to provide information about the treaty and detail the obligations these sectors would incur with treaty implementation. Participants noted certain challenges that they would face in advocating ratification or accession to the BTWC. These include the need to inform relevant government departments, particularly Finance, of the importance of joining the treaty.
While some state’s constitutional processes provided for ratification or accession to occur before national implementing legislation is adopted, on the whole participating states (including civil law states) noted that they need to have implementing legislation in place before they complete BTWC ratification or accession process. Participants noted challenges for their states adopting BTWC implementing legislation. The most common problem was that they have too few legislative drafters available, along with competing implementation priorities. As the states are yet to join the treaty, they also still have to ascertain what technical assistance they may require with respect to national implementing legislation.
The representatives from the target states noted that awareness-raising activities, such as demarches by the EU Presidency and other Member States, were very helpful in highlighting the importance of the treaty and the EU’s commitment to encouraging and supporting states to join it. Some participants felt that country-specific information seminars, involving a broader range of relevant national actors and stakeholders than can participate in the EUJA regional meetings, would be helpful in securing national support for ratification or accession.
Theme 3: ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’
Biotechnology is applied in all target states. In most instances it is limited to food production and agriculture. Applications related to human therapy and pharmaceutical development are undertaken in facilities owned by foreign entities. The participants agreed that biotechnology can only be applied to help improving health and wealth of their societies and rejected any malicious use.
The quality of oversight of the biotechnology activities varies considerably. In some countries, the authorities or professional councils authorize, certify or monitor the individuals and their activities. In some cases inspectors have been appointed. Other countries, however, lack the legal infrastructure to ensure that only legitimate activities take place. In practically all target states ethical principles regarding applications in biotechnology are missing.
EU assistance would be welcomed in the areas of information sharing on new developments in biotechnology; building the capacity to organize the oversight of biotechnology activities and people involved in them; and the establishment of procedures to be followed for implementing BTWC. The representatives from the target states pointed out that they do not merely seek financial and budgetary support from the EU, but also expert advice on the beneficial use of biotechnology and the implementation of BTWC.
D. Concluding sessions
Following the plenary discussion of the Workgroup reports, Dr Jean Pascal Zanders drew attention to four important issues that were touched in the margins of the other debates:- Cost of joining the BTWC: As the BTWC does not have an international organisation, ratification of accession does not entail any immediate costs. However, there are costs related to the participation in the treaty work programme (e.g., meetings of the States parties, expert meetings). States also assume a number of responsibilities on the national level, such as implementation and participation in the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which involves personnel resources. This cost is marginal if compared to the lives of national it may help to save and the new opportunities to protect the agriculture it creates.
- Depositing instruments of ratification or accession: The governments of the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States are the co-depositories of the BTWC (rather than the UN). The instrument of ratification of accession must be submitted to at least one of these governments, who will transmit the information to the other depositories and states Parties.
- Confidence Building Measures: The CBMs are annual reports on a State party’s implementation of the BTWC. These must be submitted to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs by 15 April of each year. A State Party is required to make resources available to collate and submit this information, but this cost is offset by the generation of transparency regarding certain activities and the ability to assess the status of treaty implementation by other States Parties.
- The 6th Review Conference, 20 November–8 December 2006: At the Review Conference States Parties are expected to review the overall status of treaty implementation and compliance, assess the convention in the light of scientific and technological developments, and decide on a work programme between the 6th and 7th Review Conferences (which will be held in 2011). States not yet Party to the BTWC can apply for observer status. The issues to be discussed are also of direct relevance to them.
In his closing address, Ambassador James B. Chepsongol, Acting Director for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that as Kenya is celebrating the 30th anniversary of its accession to the BTWC it will continue to explore ways to universalise the convention. He believed that political impediments are less an obstacle to universalisation than the need for information and capacity to implement the treaty. He also reflected on the need for an international organisation to implement the BTWC. While this would necessarily involve extra costs to the States Parties, the benefits for all would exceed the costs by far. He concluded his intervention by thanking the speakers and the UN Office in Nairobi for supporting the two-day seminar.
Ms Annalisa Giannella thanked Kenya for its support for this meeting and for its continued universalisation efforts. The objective of the seminar was to promote universality and national implementation of the BTWC. States are now more aware of the biological threats as well as the benefits of acceding to the convention, including cooperation and assistance from the EU, WHO, OIE and ICRC. The EU is committed to follow up on this seminar and will consider requests for assistance. The States represented at the meeting will hopefully also follow up so that within the next year the number of States Party to the BTWC increases. She called upon them to keep the EU updated on any action they undertake towards joining the bTWC. Meanwhile, their comments will help guide the implementation and development of future activities under the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC.