Report of the regional seminar for Asia and the Pacific Islands
I. Introduction
The second regional meeting in support of the universalisation of theSix regional States not Party to the BTWC were represented: Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, and Niue.
Nine regional BTWC States Parties were represented: Australia, Bhutan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Singapore, and Thailand. (Kazakhstan refused proposed travel arrangements; Kiribati, which would have been represented by the High Commissioner to Fiji, cancelled at the last moment as a consequence of political developments in Fiji; Tuvalu
Representatives from five International and Regional Organisations participated: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).
The EU was represented by the Presidency, the Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, and eight EU Member States (France, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain), as well as the EU–Institute for Security Studies.
II. Meeting proceedings
A. Introductions
Ambassador Lars Backström (Finland; Presidency of the European Union) welcomed the participants and highlighted the growing threat posed by biological weapons (BW).Ms Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU Member States and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Mr Javier Solana, and thanked the United Nations for the logistical support.
The motivation for the second regional seminal in support of the universalisation of the BTWC is rooted in the EU’s Security Strategy and the Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both documents are based on three principles, namely effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation, and partnership. The effective multilateralism is reflected in the EU’s political and financial contribution to efforts to universalise the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the BTWC. In trying to prevent threats from emerging, the EU seeks to address the complexities and root causes of threats and risks. In the case of the BW threat, the EU contribution is multifaceted and combines many policy tools. With regard to the strengthening of the BTWC, it involves cooperation with other states—notably, the USA, Russia, Japan and China—and international organisations. The EU now also inserts a so-called ‘non-proliferation clause’ in all cooperation and assistance agreements with third countries as a preventive and cooperative measure. It creates an opportunity to engage in a wider security dialogue on the root causes of regional instability.
The EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC, of which the regional seminar in Bangkok is a part, has a double objective. First, it aims to raise awareness about the importance of BTWC universality to Asia and the Pacific Region. It encourages States that have signed the BTWC before its entry into force in 1975 to ratify it and non-signatory States to accede to the Convention. Second, the EU is prepared to offer legal or legislative implementation assistance to States Parties to the BTWC that request such assistance. It is the intention to request the EU Member States to expand this second component in order to be able to provide a similar type of assistance to countries that are in the process of ratifying or acceding to the BTWC.
By way of conclusion, an appeal to participate as a member or an observer in the upcoming Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 20 November–8 December) to the States not yet party to the BTWC was made.
Ms Suchinda Chotipanich, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, Thailand next welcomed the participants. She highlighted the importance of strengthening the BTWC in Asia and the Pacific Region in light of the rapid economic growth and expansion of the industrial infrastructure, which increase the potential for countries to become suppliers of dual-use materials and technologies. She also emphasised the active participation of all States Parties in order to achieve continued success in the BTWC process.
B. Summary of presentations
The first session of the regional seminar dealt with the BTWC universalisation and regional security aspects.Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project and entrusted with the technical implementation of the EU Joint Action, offered a brief summary of the BTWC and the current status of the norm against BW. Worldwide, the BTWC has 155 States Parties. Forty States still remain outside the convention. In Asia and the Pacific Region 37 States out a total of 48 are Party to the convention (77 %). There remain 11 States not Party to the BTWC (= 23 %), of which two are signatory states. He also addressed some of the issues related to ratification and accession to the BTWC and highlighted the principal benefits from becoming a Party.
Mr Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob, Under Secretary, Multilateral Political Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia presented a view from the region on the security issues in Asia and the Pacific Region and how they relate to the BTWC. He considered that the region was essentially secure, stable and peaceful and underscored the role played by ASEAN. Therefore, the recent nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) came as a great shock. Security in the region, and for Malaysia in particular, is also defined by threats posed by non-state actors. This threat has increased after 11 September 2001. However, the region has also already witnessed at least one terrorist organisation developing large-scale biological and chemical weapons. A different type of threat is the increase of emerging diseases such as SARS and Avian Flu to the region. Cooperation in regional forums is of utmost importance to address this threat.
He next turned to the BTWC and Malaysia’s efforts to support the convention. He regretted the lack of an international organisation or permanent secretariat to support treaty implementation. He also supported the calls to improve the process of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in order to enable States to demonstrate compliance on an ongoing basis. He called upon States Parties to return to the discussions on verification, despite the recent difficulties. An incremental process towards establishment of such a mechanism would be a good start. Effective implementation of the treaty requires full implementation of all articles on a non-discriminatory basis and all interlinked elements of treaty should be dealt with together. He also affirmed that Malaysia has never had an interest in developing BW and remains committed to Article I.
He concluded by noting that one of the main challenges to achieve universality is that many of states not yet Party to the BTWC in Asia and the Pacific Region do not view BW as an imminent threat. The problem is compounded by the lack of an international support organisation. He therefore welcomed the EU seminar as it is important to raise awareness of threat in Asia and the Pacific Region.
Mr Pascal Le Deunff, First Counsellor, Embassy of the French Republic in Bangkok, Thailand offered a vision from Europe on the threat in Asia and the Pacific Region and the possible role of the BTWC in reducing the threat. He noted that there are many sources of conflict and security challenges in the region. He pointed to internal security risks, for example resulting from ethnic or religious tensions, which could spill over into neighbouring countries, and transnational regional security threats posed by terrorist organisations. The Bali bombing demonstrated the transnational reach of regional Islamic terrorist groups.
He pointed to the necessity of regional security infrastructure. Most of the challenges require interregional cooperation and response. The ASEAN Regional Forum was established to build cooperative ties and has become the most important forum for security dialogue and confidence-building in the region. However, it is still essentially limited to dialogue, but may move towards more proactive activities in the future.
He considered that biological and
Discussion
The subsequent discussion focussed on three main themes, namely the detection of materials that may be used in the preparation of a biological attack, the ease of weaponising biological agents, and the nature of regional security frameworks.
The difficulty to detect materials—and pathogens in particular—that may be used in an attack is very difficult. Hence the importance of early detection and surveillance systems. As the BTWC is a very short treaty, it does not have the tools to undertake this. Some international organisations, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) track diseases. However, they have no responsibility to determine whether an outbreak is deliberate or not (forensic epidemiology). To this end, there exist investigative mechanisms within the UN to undertake these tasks.
While not impossible, it is difficult to use biological materials as a weapon. It requires a number of specialised skills and the individual or group must have access to the desired pathogen. As most of the pathogens under consideration cannot be transmitted from person to person, there is a requirement for production in large volumes. It was emphasised that such a weapon programme produces a large footprint, and that it was important for law enforcement forces to be trained in detecting the signature so that the programme can be terminated before the attack is executed. It was also pointed out that anti-plant or anti-animal agents might be selected to cause economic damage, and that such agents pose a far lower risk to the perpetrator.
A security framework does not necessarily refer to a military organisation (like NATO). A regional security framework for Asia and the Pacific Region could be something like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the European Union. It was noted that ASEAN has already played an important role in getting other regional states into a process of building this kind of architecture.
The second session focussed on matters relating to the ratification or accession and national implementation of the BTWC.
Ms Angela Woodward, Legal Coordinator at the Bioweapons Prevention Project for possible assistance programmes under the EU Joint Action, explained the technical aspects of ratification and accession and summarised the obligations States Parties to the BTWC assume in order to translate the prohibitions in the convention into national legislation. She also highlighted the legal and legislative implementation assistance the EU can make available to States Party to the BTWC that request such assistance.
Dr Namchai Chewawiwat, National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC), Thailand offered a detailed overview of Thailand’s BTWC implementation activities and other steps it undertakes to promote the norms in the convention. Until 2005 it had a Working Group on BTWC, which in 2006 became the National Coordinating Committee on BTWC. This body is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Science and Technology and has committees with high-level experts from 9 ministries (Agriculture and Cooperatives, Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Industry, Natural Resources and Environment, Office of the Prime Minister, Public Health, and Science and Technology). Thailand is active on both the national and international levels. It participates at meetings of the States Parties to the BTWC in Geneva. Furthermore, it improves national legislation, organises workshops and training sessions, and organises as well as participates in a variety of national and regional conferences, meetings and seminars. Thailand also publishes books, reports and pamphlets in Thai and English on the BW threat and aspects of dealing with it (notably on biosafety and biosecurity and on codes of conduct).
Dr Volker Beck, Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of Germany, detailed the obligations all states (irrespective of whether they are Party to the BTWC or not) have under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the types of measures they need to adopt in order to meet the requirements of the resolution. He also presented an overview of State participation in the reporting on the implementation of the obligations. He noted that there exists a far-reaching parallel between the obligations states already have under UNSC Resolution 1540 and the ones they would assume upon ratifying or acceding to the BTWC, implying that the States not yet Party to the BTWC would not take on new major logistical or resource burdens to implement the convention. He highlighted, however, that under Article IV of the BTWC Parties are required to adopt measures to prevent the development, production, stockpiling acquisition of retention of BW, an obligation that is not included in UNSC Resolution 1540.
Discussion
Myanmar informed the seminar that it is preparing the ratification of the BTWC (as well as the CWC) and queried whether model legislation is available under the EU Joint Action. The representative noted that certain areas—notably transport—lack regulations. The Representative of FAO asked about opportunities for assistance on technical issues. Cook Islands drew attention to the fact that it is a very small island state and does not want to set up a structure to overburden the country.
It was highlighted that there is no single approach in transposing the BTWC obligations into national legislation, and, as a consequence, to have a single model law. The requirements, for example, for the Pacific Island States are quite different from those States that have a large biotechnology industry. Furthermore, states may already have laws and regulations in place that cover certain aspects of the implementation requirements, meaning that only specific components need to developed or improved. Therefore there is a need for adjustment in the preparations for implementation assistance. Presently the EU Joint Action focusses on implementation assistance, whereby a small team of EU experts can visit the State Party to assist in-country teams with the drafting of legislation. Similar assistance for States that are in the process of ratifying or acceding to the BTWC will most likely be considered under a follow-on Joint Action. It was noted, however, that at the meetings of technical experts and of States Parties a lot of information on technical issues is shared among the participants, which reinforces the need to become Party to the convention.
In discussing the scope of the required laws and regulations, the dual-use aspect of the biological agents and some of the equipment necessary to manipulate them was also touched upon. The Australia Group list of dual-use technologies is the most comprehensive list available and has now even been adopted by many States around the world that do not participate in the Australia Group meetings. The dual-use characteristics lay at the heart of the need of national legislation: the BTWC does not restrict legitimate use of technologies in science and industry. Government authorities need to know what facilities are present inside the country and which types of activities they undertake. Laws and regulations thus contribute to the creation of the domestic knowledge required for reporting under the BTWC and UNSC Resolution 1540.
Although few states have done so, it was noted that small countries may benefit from joining the acts dealing with the prohibition of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in order to avoid overburdening national resources. According to the UNSC 1540 reports, at least one large Asian State has tried to cover all weapon categories under a single omnibus act.
In the afternoon, the seminar turned to a number of practical and emerging issues related to the implementation of the BTWC. The first session focussed on the public health dimension.
Dr May Chu, BioRisk Reduction for Dangerous Pathogens Team, WHO, outlined the preparations the WHO has undertaken to counter public health emergencies of international concern. Since 2002, the WHO has the mandate to mount a global public health response to the natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radiological materials that affect health. As part of this mandate, it has set up a major campaign to raise awareness about the importance of health research and the risks posed by the misuse of valuable research and materials. Among their activities are the publication of books, fact sheets on select biological agents, the establishment of global networks of experts and laboratories, information dissemination procedures, and programmes related to training and quality assurance. The WHO is implementing a national pandemic preparedness programme that builds on a regionally implemented strategy for strengthening national early warning and response systems. The result is a rapid increase of the number of countries with plans or plans in preparation. The WHO has also created a network on the deliberate use of chemical and biological agents, and interacts with many other international organisations to address this particular threat.
With regard to the biological threat, the WHO runs a ‘national preparedness assessment’ programme offering advice and may initiate a public health response to an attack, but it is not involved in detection nor in the determination of the origin of the attack.
(The presentation was delivered by Dr Kraatz-Wadsack on behalf of Dr Chu.)
Dr Ronello Abila, Regional Coordinator of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Thailand, focussed on the threat to animal health, and the OIE’s work plan, which includes information dissemination, the development and implementation of standards, prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases, capacity building for National Veterinary Services, and exerting influence on policies related to animal health and welfare. He noted that the threat from animal diseases to Asia and the Pacific Region is great, as the diseases can now spread faster across the world than the average incubation period of most diseases. Referring to the outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Southeast Asia, he argued that such outbreaks have high economic and social consequences, and contribute to the loss of livelihoods and increase in poverty. Many animal pathogens can pose a potential risk to human health.
The OIE has undertaken a number of initiatives to establish early warning and detection systems, rapid notification mechanisms and rapid response systems. It invests in the improvement of governance and veterinary policies, capacity building, and the establishment of quality centres for support to countries. In the short term, its priorities are on infected and high-risk countries; in the long term the needs of all developing countries and countries in transition will be addressed.
Discussion
Dr Subhash Morzaria, Chief Technical Advisor, FAO Regional Office, Bangkok first highlighted the FAO’s role in animal and food health. The FAO looks at animal diseases from a slightly different angle than the BTWC or security aspect. It is more interested in food security and food safety, impact of animal diseases on human health, as many of them are zoonotic and can cross over to humans. In considering responses to these transboundary diseases it works together with WHO and OIE. Its primary goal is to control disease at the source, which involves working with poor farmers in developing countries. The activities include supporting grass-roots capacity-building in areas such as disease reporting/monitoring.
The role of WHO, FAO and OIE in dealing with suspicious outbreaks of disease was discussed in some detail. In particular, it is important to realise that these organisations consider disease issues without political judgment as it is difficult for them to assist states to strengthen their health infrastructure if the political dimensions of naming the perpetrator of a (presumed) biological attack are combined with the primary mandates of disease mitigation, prevention and response. There is a role for the UN in determining suspicious disease outbreaks. At a table-top exercise run by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) involving WHO, FAO and OIE, care was taken to avoid interfering with the mandate of the latter three organisations. It was made clear that if experts from these organisations were to participate in any UN investigation they would be UN experts and not representatives of their respective organisations.
The second afternoon session looked into the benefits, challenges and responsibilities that accompany progress in science and technology.
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York) highlighted the benefits biotechnology can bring with regard to new pharmaceuticals, advances in medicine, agriculture, materials and computing. However, these same advances applied in the military sphere can also contribute to the development of effective designer BW. In addition, since more people in a growing number of disciplines have access to the knowledge and expertise, the risk of misuse of biotechnology also increases. It has become a matter of urgency to understand this risk, and develop ways of dealing with it. The provisions of the BTWC offers a number of tools to reduce the risk of misuse while promoting the legitimate application of biotechnology. As the UN Secretary-General stated in April 2006, ‘the proper antidote to biological weapons threats is the Biological Weapons Convention’.
Dr Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, UK explored the responsibility dimension further. He noted that there were certain risks involved in the development of biotechnology, and that the public’s acceptance of the risks depends on trust held in the relevant institutions. If that trust is lost then it is not easy to rebuild. Therefore it is prudent to have wide public debates on the prohibition of BW, so that the research and professional communities are cognisant of biosecurity concerns and that they, together with the governments, can consider appropriate biosecurity precautionary measures. The development of professional codes can contribute significantly to raising awareness in the relevant communities.
Discussion
The participants reflected on the multi-faceted approach required to avoid the misuse of biotechnology for hostile purposes. It was noted that the dangers of misuse are not solely with the so-called new biology and biotechnology, but that their traditional counterparts (e.g., fermenting techniques and naturally occurring pathogens) can also be misused. Referring back to the morning discussion about the appropriateness of a single model law, it was noted that the different facets of control can be achieved through the use of so-called drafting elements for implementation legislation to achieve the combination that is most appropriate for the country. Layering, particularly of codes, is another option: there can be an overarching code (like the Hippocratic oath), industry codes (e.g., applicable to microbiologists) as well as workplace codes (applicable to one workplace).
The Cook Islands queried whether the EU can take this multifaceted approach into account when addressing the drafting requirements and could organise a workshop on these issues for national stakeholders so that all relevant sectors can consider their respective responsibilities. Under the current EU Joint Action it is not possible to provide other types of assistance than that with implementation of the BTWC. However, the regional seminars also form part of a learning process for the EU to better understand the needs of states and elements that are broader in scope are being considered for a follow-on Joint Action. It was also noted that the EU has other cooperative projects, which may address some of the needs. For the current technical assistance visits, it is envisaged that the EU experts will meet with different kinds of stakeholders in the country that has requested such assistance.
The third and final afternoon session considered a number of practical issues relating to the implementation of the BTWC.
Dr Robert Mathews, Head of NBC Arms Control, CBRN Defence Centre, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Department of Defence, Australia, addressed the question of dual-use technologies and the potential for deliberate or inadvertent contributions to BW programmes, whether run by states or non-state actors. As it is not possible to draw up finite lists of agents and equipment, the BTWC addresses the question of dual-use application through the so-called General Purpose Criterion in Article I. As a result, the prohibition has a broad scope as it covers all pathogens and toxins intended for hostile purposes, including emerging diseases and developments in biology. From an implementation perspective, however, the GPC is difficult to translate into domestic legislation and regulations covering criminalisation as well as domestic and international transfers.
The Australia Group developed lists of human, animal and plant pathogens based on sets of considerations, as well as ones for biological equipment. These lists are regularly reviewed and have gradually become accepted as a benchmark for export controls. Nonetheless, criminalisation under Article I of the BTWC cannot be limited to such lists, and any legislation must include the General Purpose Criterion.
Ms Natascha Wessel, Federal Export Office, Germany, reflected on the practical implementation of the export controls. The Australia Group lists are incorporated into EU law are therefore applicable to all EU Member States. The implementation of export controls requires a robust legal framework as well as effective licensing procedures that can differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses. This differentiation is largely technical, which means export control authorities need to rely on experts. As the licensing process can be time consuming, it is generally implemented in such a way that it does not obstruct legitimate trade, for example, by not requiring individual applications for certain facilities, or by requiring post facto notification. Regular reviews of the licensing procedures are conducted. The EU is now also carrying out a project to grant export control assistance to third countries. This assistance may cover many areas, such as the drafting of control lists, sanctions and judicial implementation (which may involve training of judges and public prosecutors to give them information to evaluate cases before they come to court), briefings to customs agencies and relevant ministries, as well as industry outreach.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders presented an outline of an integrated set of measures to reduce the threat posed by biological agents, whether through natural outbreaks or deliberate release. He emphasised the need to consider generic measures because a society cannot know in advance which disease it will have to confront (particularly in the case with emerging diseases of attacks with pathogens). These generic measures are generally cost-effective, support the improvement of the general health infrastructure, and are designed to maintain the public confidence in the authorities. Once this is in place, some very specific measures (such as a vaccine stockpile against a low-probability, high-consequence pathogen) can be considered. He concluded by noting that being a Party to the BTWC makes it easier for other States Parties to offer assistance with the design and technical execution of such preventive measures.
Dr Robert Mathews covered the different dimensions of law enforcement with regard to the prevention of deliberate disease: enactment of legislation, training of law enforcement officials, cooperation between relevant agencies, the outreach to the scientific community, and international cooperation. Each of the first three articles of the BTWC as well as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 defines specific requirements and thus responsibilities for different ministries or agencies. These responsibilities and procedures to execute them need to be identified, prepared, coordinated and integrated.
In the second part of the presentation, he presented the case study of the Lauhala drug syndicate in Fiji, whose dismantlement involved the cooperation between a range of national and international agencies. The case study served to highlight the problem of so-called safe havens, whereby transnational criminal or terrorist organisations can move their operations to states with weak or non-existent national legislation or law-enforcement procedures.
Mr Daoming Zhang and Mr Giovanni Santoro, Interpol Regional Office, Bangkok, offered some comments based on practice in Southeast Asia. It was highlighted that when discussing the diversion or misuse of biological agents or toxins through organised or transnational crime, one needs to consider that these crimes are usually linked to other transnational crimes such as money laundering. Organised criminal networks are central in such operations. Therefore, it is necessary to address these issues comprehensively. International cooperation is important, but so is internal coordination. In the field, departments and agencies do not communicate easily or effectively with each other for internal political reasons. Regarding international cooperation, it was also noted that many countries in Asia and the Pacific Region still have capital punishment, which can lead to difficulties when dealing with countries that have abolished it (notably the EU).
They also noted that BW are easier to achieve for terrorists. However, many states have not criminalised preparatory acts, so law enforcement cannot investigate such acts as crimes until an event has occurred. To address this question, Interpol’s Bioterrorism Unit and Biocriminalization Programme has prepared training materials and guides and organises training workshops for law enforcement officials.
Discussion
Much of the discussion that followed the presentation focussed on the central point that effective law enforcement requires that the appropriate laws are in place. If not, a State’s capacity to respond will be severely limited and it may create a safe haven for BW-related activities. As was noted several times during the day, prevention is an important component of the BTWC: the need exists to ensure that preparatory acts are criminalised and backed up with appropriate law enforcement in order to prevent crimes from occurring.
Several States not yet Party to the BTWC reflected on the needs for, and different facets of, effective law enforcement and wondered whether the EU can assist them with this. The EU is implementing or developing different types of assistance outside the present Joint Action (which focusses on universalisation and national implementation assistance), including technical assistance for export controls, training for customs, or enhancing the physical protection of laboratories. The EU also offers assistance with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. However, considering the EU decision-making processes, Joint Actions on assistance programmes target biological, chemical and nuclear weapons separately and they cannot be integrated
C. Workgroups
On the second day, participants broke up in two working groups to discuss in detail three major themes, namely Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility; Regional security issues and the BTWC, and Ratification and accession to the BTWC: Legal and administrative requirements.Theme 1: ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’
The participants were in widespread agreement regarding the tremendous promise of biotechnology and thought that the benefits outweigh the risks. Nevertheless, biotechnology development was limited, particularly in the target states. If there are biotechnology activities, then they are mostly related to agriculture or public health.
Despite this situation, the participants were conscious of some of the risks involved. In particular, concerns existed relating to economic control through dependence on biotechnology, the possibility of accidents in high-containment laboratories where emerging and re-emerging diseases are being researched, and bioterrorism. The latter aspect played a role mostly as a consequence of the preparations for deliberate release of pathogens by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan in the early 1990s, although these attempts failed. Although the participants appreciated the difficulties of successfully employing biological weapons and assessed that terrorists are more likely to resort to conventional explosives, they were nonetheless concerned about the potential for mass disruption and economic consequences. There are many risk aspects that need to be addressed.
The target states appear to have limited legislative or regulatory frameworks in place to deal with the various aspects of overseeing biotechnology activities. Nonetheless, Nauru had regulations concerning genetically modified organisms in the area of agriculture in place as an outcome of an international conference. It also traditionally ships pathogen samples to New Zealand for analysis in the case of disease outbreaks. The representative was not aware of any specific regulations governing those transports.
The discussions revealed the need for raising issue awareness and communication of threats. It was noted that these issues are the subject of discussions in the context of BTWC meetings. States not yet Party to the BTWC wanted to learn more about what the BTWC can offer with regard to the discussed issue areas through the meetings of the States parties or in bilateral contexts.
Theme 2: ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’
Participants agreed that there is a need to adapt the understanding of security with regard to major threats and the nature of the actors involved. Traditional inter-state security risks and challenges are less relevant today as a result of the positive effect of regional cooperative forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, that help to mitigate inter-state disputes. Therefore security in Asia and the Pacific Region should also address non-traditional actors, such as terrorist and transnational criminal groups. The security concept should also be broadened in order to encompass environmental, societal and health threat issues as well as transnational criminal activities, which are of particular concern to the Pacific region.
While many participants recognised that the BW threat is not imminent in the region, there was a broad agreement on the assessment of a growing threat involving the misuse of biological agents for hostile purposes mainly as a consequence of advances in biotechnology and science.
Therefore there is an urgent need to address this threat at international, regional and national level. At the international level, the accession of all states to the BTWC will help to close territorial gaps that could be exploited by states, terrorists or transnational criminal groups seeking to acquire BW. In this context the participants discussed transit, transhipment and brokering issues, as well as the phenomenon of ‘safe havens’.
Close regional cooperation and the accession of all states to the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties are central to addressing the threat from unconventional weapons. The participants called for greater active involvement of existing regional mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, SAARC, and the Pacific Islands Forum (especially its Foreign Regional Security Committee). It is necessary to put the BTWC and related concerns on the political agenda of these forums as well as on the agenda of the ACP-EU meetings in order to raise awareness about the importance of the BTWC.
Adoption of relevant national measures to prevent and to cope with BW use is the starting point for any international cooperation. Implementation of such measures was described as continuous learning process in which sharing of experience and good practices within the region is highly desirable. Particularly with regard to the question of terrorists using existing transnational criminal networks for their offensive purposes, it was felt that effective national implementation of the BTWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 as well as regional cooperation is needed. Assistance needs are not exclusively related to drafting of national legislation, but also to training of customs officers and policemen, to provision of equipment, vaccines, etc. Sharing of intelligence among partners in the region was identified as key factor for successful action against bio-terrorism.
Many participants drew attention to competing demands for accession to and national implementation of international treaties. This situation was of particular concern to states with limited administrative resources, which have to select carefully among few national priorities. Raising public awareness about the relevance of the BTWC and BW threat, both among the government officials/MPs as well as among citizens and non-governmental organisations, was seen as a precondition for proceeding with the accession to the BTWC. For BTWC members, awareness-raising about the BW threat and terrorism is an issue related to mobilisation of its citizens and government officials for adoption of national implementation measures. Several countries suggested that an excessive awareness-raising campaign might be counterproductive, as it might lead to ‘issue fatigue’ or panic.
Finally, accession to the BTWC can facilitate international cooperation in the area of the BTWC national implementation, capacity building, scientific cooperation and provision of assistance.
Theme 3: ‘Ratification and accession to the BTWC: Legal and administrative requirements’
It appears that the process for ratification or accession is relatively straightforward for all the target states. In some cases it simply involves making a recommendation for ratification or accession to the Cabinet (Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue). In Myanmar, ratification involves a Ministerial decision, however, if no consensus can be achieved the ratification proposal is sent to the Cabinet for decision. In other cases Parliament must approve the ratification bill or resolution following submission by the Government (Marshall Islands, Nepal).
Nevertheless, there is a clear need for awareness-raising among government stakeholders and parliamentarians to encourage ratification and inform national implementation and among non-governmental community (law enforcement, industry, media etc) to inform them of their responsibilities and national implementation issues.
Potential imperatives for joining do not include traditional security issues. Not being seen as the ‘weak link’ in the global non-proliferation environment is a greater driver (as it was for the CWC and the Ottawa Convention, for example). Identifying the relevance of membership for overcoming existing issues for the state is helpful (e.g., the link with public health). Existing priorities for the states include climate change and rising sea levels.
Because of the great differences in size between the very small island states, other island states and the larger target states in this region, there are large differences regarding implementation requirements and capabilities. Possible problems include achieving ‘buy-in’ from relevant stakeholder communities (which may be overcome by awareness-raising activities), capacity of government departments (especially when these may comprise only a few officials), inappropriate assistance, such as over-burdensome model implementation structures, raising BTWC ratification and national implementation on national agenda (given competing priorities, such as passing tax law over BTWC implementing law).
In this context, the participants identified a number of specific assistance needs. The principal need relates to raising awareness among all relevant stakeholders on the importance of joining the BTWC and the relevance of the treaty to national priorities and global security. Examples or experiences of achieving political support for ratification and national implementation in other similar states that have joined the BTWC would be most welcome. The specific responsibilities and obligations of each stakeholder group should be clarified. In addition, the representatives from the target states want to know what range of assistance is available and from which organisations (for example, EU, Interpol, etc.).
With regard to national implementation, the target states would most likely require assistance with drafting legislation. They also viewed advice and training relating to implementation and enforcement as very important, as well as with the preparation of the CBMs. It was noted that it is important to proceed with ratification and accession and conduct necessary national implementation activities afterwards, rather than delaying ratification/accession until national implementation processes are underway or completed.
The States not yet Party to the BTWC have had the experience that they were targeted in support of the universalisation of a treaty before, and once the accession goal was achieved they were left alone. There is a need for these states to follow up on developments in the treaty. However, they lack the funds to participate in treaty meetings or other forums in which related issues are discussed. To this end, they consider funding to participate in BTWC meetings helpful.
Discussion
In the plenary discussion that followed the presentation of the working group reports, the point was made not to ignore the threat posed by state actors. While this has been considerably reduced over the past few years, the recent nuclear weapon test by the DPRK demonstrates a lingering interest in unconventional weapons. There are also some fears that the DPRK and perhaps a few other states might be pursuing a BW programme. In these cases it is important to act before those states achieve the weapon capability.
It was also noted that while presently biotechnology may play only a limited role in some states, there are still some unexpected consequences to consider. One example was the testimony of the transfer of pathogen samples for analysis by commercial courier, which raises some important issues relating to biosafety. Another aspect is the transfer of knowledge. While the risks involved may not be high, they need to be attended to.
In terms of raising awareness, the importance of placing the universalisation of the BTWC on the agenda of the EU–APC political dialogue meetings was noted. The present EU regional seminar for Asia and the Pacific Region is also a first activity in support of raising awareness.
D. Closing session
In her meeting conclusions, Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack noted the importance of international organisations in supporting the universalisation of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. The BTWC lacks such a support structure, which makes the process of promoting the convention difficult. The treaty is both comprehensive and complex, yet it is the best protection against the BW proliferation threat. In particular, it is important for states to realise the full spectrum of the threat, which ranges from state programmes to terrorists or criminals seeking pathogens for malicious intent, but may also involve the witting or unwitting contribution by many actors, including scientists, industry, shipping agencies, and so on. She also urged the States not yet Party to the BTWC to request observer status at the forthcoming Review Conference so that they can observe the development of the treaty regime and discuss their specific needs regarding ratification or accession and implementation with States Parties.Ms Annalisa Giannella closed the meeting by observing that the objective of the seminar was to promote universality and national implementation of the BTWC. It also demonstrated the EU’s commitment to Asia and the Pacific Region and its interest in international cooperation to address the threats posed by proliferation. The seminar also confirmed that the EU and Asia and the Pacific Region think similarly about and have a common interest in security. States are now more aware of the biological threats as well as the benefits of acceding to the convention, including cooperation and assistance from the EU, WHO, OIE, Interpol and the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The EU is committed to follow up on this seminar and will consider requests for assistance. Meanwhile, the comments from the participants will help guide the implementation and development of future activities under the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC.