Report of the regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean
I. Introduction
The third regional meeting in support of the universalisation of theOne regional State not Party to the BTWC was represented: Trinidad and Tobago. The other two regional States not Party to the BTWC, Guyana and Haiti, were not in a position to join the seminar.
Eleven regional BTWC States Parties were represented: Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru and Suriname.
Representatives from five International and Regional Organisations participated: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Organization of American States (OAS), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), New York and Geneva branches.
The EU was represented by the Presidency, the Office of the Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Costa Rica, and six EU Member States (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom), European Commission Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (SANCO), as well as the EU–Institute for Security Studies.
II. Meeting proceedings
A. Introductions
Ambassador Volker Fink (Germany; Presidency of the European Union) welcomed the participants. He highlighted the importance of the universalisation of the BTWC and called on the States not yet Party to ratify or accede to the convention.Ambassador Edgar Alvarez, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Costa Rica, viewed the organisation of the seminar in Costa Rica as a recognition of the peaceful nature of the Costa Rican people and their support for disarmament and human rights. Costa Rica ratified the BTWC in September 1973. He welcomed the inclusion of presentations on experiences with the implementation of the BTWC in the seminar programme, because many developing nations have problems with developing the required legislation and often experience financial difficulties in meeting their obligations under the convention. He considered BTWC implementation a fundamental aspect.
He noted the high cost of military expenditure and the resulting diversion of financial resources from development and health care. The EU, Costa Rica and the States represented at the seminar agree that unconventional weapons destabilise international peace and security, and he therefore called on all to promote investment in public health, housing, poverty alleviation rather than in the expansion of military capabilities.
Dr Andreas Strub, Coordinator, Office of the High Representative’s Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, who chaired the regional seminar, welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU Member States and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Mr Javier Solana, and thanked Ambassador Alvarez for the Foreign Ministry’s support of the seminar and Costa Rica’s hospitality.
The motivation for the third regional seminal in support of the universalisation of the BTWC is rooted in the EU’s Security Strategy and the Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both documents are based on three principles, namely effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation / partnership. The effective multilateralism is reflected in the EU’s political and financial contribution to efforts to universalise the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Additional Protocol and the BTWC. In trying to prevent threats from emerging, the EU seeks to address the complexities and root causes of threats and risks. In the case of the BW threat, the EU contribution is multifaceted and combines many policy tools. With regard to the strengthening of the BTWC, it involves cooperation with other states and international organisations. The EU now also inserts a so-called ‘non-proliferation clause’ in all cooperation and association agreements with third countries as a preventive and cooperative measure. It creates an opportunity to engage in a wider security dialogue on the root causes of regional instability. The clause now forms part of agreements with approximately 90 States.
The EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC, of which the regional seminar in San José is a part, has a double objective. First, it aims to raise awareness about the importance of BTWC universality to Latin America and the Caribbean. It encourages States that have signed the BTWC before its entry into force in 1975 to ratify it and non-signatory States to accede to the Convention. At the 6th Review Conference of the BTWC, the EU was not alone in identifying universalisation as a key priority for the 7th Review Conference to be held in 2011. A group of Latin American States also offered concrete proposals on how to achieve universalisation of the convention. Second, the EU is prepared to offer legal or legislative implementation assistance to States Parties to the BTWC that request such assistance. Participants were encouraged to make their needs known (Technical Assistance Request Forms were included in the seminar folder).
B. Summary of presentations
The first session of the regional seminar dealt with the BTWC universalisation and regional security aspects.Ambassador José Zuquilanda, Interim Representative of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Costa Rica presented a view from the region on the security issues in Latin America and the Caribbean and how they relate to the BTWC. The OAS has considered peace and security in the Hemisphere as an essential objective since its creation in 1948. It has gradually expanded this goal to include arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of first conventional, and later unconventional weapons. The Joint Political Statement issued at the Special Conference on Security in Mexico City in 2003 emphasised the commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and called on all Member States to fully implement the BTWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The OAS also recognised the emerging threat posed by terrorism and the possible terrorist acquisition and use of unconventional weapons. The issues of weapons control are included in the annual agenda of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security. In December 2006, the Committee held a special meeting dedicated to combatting the spread of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Ambassador Zuquilanda concluded by noting that the States of the Hemisphere recognise the grave danger posed by WMD and their commitment to the relevant international treaties and policies to prevent the proliferation of these weapons.
Ambassador Baron Olivier Gillès de Pélechy (Belgium) offered a vision from Europe on the threat in Latin America and the Caribbean and the possible role of the BTWC in reducing the threat. He noted how the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean share many of the security threats and proceeded to outline how the EU addresses them both as a regional and global issue. The 6th Review Conference of the BTWC enabled the EU to update its position as regards BW and its outcome created a common agenda for future action. He pointed to the parallel in Latin America, where several regional initiatives–the Mendoza Agreement of September 1991, the Cartagena Declaration on the Renunciation of WMD of December 1991 and the Lima Commitment of June 2002—aim to generate a continent-wide commitment against the acquisition and use of unconventional weapons. He suggested that similar initiatives should be undertaken in order to cover the whole region and to build up mutual confidence through the concerted application of confidence-building measures.
Ambassador Gillès ended on a cautionary note as recent political shifts in the region may lead to realignment of alliances and thus produce a certain degree of uncertainty and instability. While these outcomes point to the need for greater security cooperation, it makes the proposition more difficult at the same time. Of concern is that the climate of uncertainty might be conducive to increased international organised crime, trade in narcotics, illegal migration, rearmament and border tensions. Chemical and biological terrorism might emerge in such an environment. This danger calls for enhanced mechanisms of political dialogue within the respective sub-regional integration systems and established institutional frameworks.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project and entrusted with the technical implementation of the EU Joint Action, offered a brief summary of the BTWC and the current status of the norm against BW. Worldwide, the BTWC has 155 States Parties. Forty States still remain outside the convention. In Latin America and the Caribbean 30 States out a total of 33 are Party to the convention (91 %). Two of the three States not yet Party to the BTWC are signatory states. He also described the regional initiatives to ban chemical and biological weapons (Mendoza Accord, Cartagena Declaration and the Lima Commitment), noting that no similar agreements or declarations exist specifically for Central America or the Caribbean.
Discussion
The discussion dealt with two major themes, namely possession of BW and BW defence programmes and the role of cooperation and development in the promotion of the BTWC.
It was noted that while the BTWC as a treaty may be weak, the norm it encompasses is very strong and the Parties to the convention have despite many setbacks over the years always tried to preserve and strengthen the convention. However, as a consequence of its weak verification and compliance mechanisms, it is not possible to satisfactorily deal with allegations of illicit BW programmes. There are rumours of BW activities, however, there exists no firm confirmation that any State possesses BW or is engaged in acquiring them. Several States maintain BW defence programmes, which are legal under the BTWC. As a consequence of the lack of transparency-enhancing mechanisms or verification tools, some States may conclude that they are a cover for offensive BW activities. Despite these uncertainties, it was noted that one can be fairly certain that the norm is holding firm.
Participants welcomed the attention paid to the promotion of public health, human rights, poverty alleviation, etc. as they are important motivators for countries to join and participate in the BTWC. Dr Strub emphasised that the EU as a donor is on record to tackle these inter-related problems in a coherent and comprehensive way.
The second session looked into the benefits, challenges and responsibilities that accompany progress in science and technology.
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York) highlighted the benefits biotechnology can bring with regard to new pharmaceuticals, advances in medicine, agriculture, materials and computing. However, these same advances applied in the military sphere can also contribute to the development of effective designer BW. In addition, since more people in a growing number of disciplines have access to the knowledge and expertise, the risk of misuse of biotechnology also increases. It has become a matter of urgency to understand this risk, and develop ways of dealing with it. The provisions of the BTWC offers a number of tools to reduce the risk of misuse while promoting the legitimate application of biotechnology. In this context she also referred to the former UN Secretary-General’s Biotechnology Initiative, which aims to bring together the major biotechnology stakeholders (industry, academia, governments and civil society) within the UN framework.
Dr Marta Valdez, Director CENIBiot Project (Costa Rica), discussed the biotechnology cooperation programme between the European Commission and Costa Rica. She first described the biotechnology sector in Costa Rica: there are 95 senior researchers, most of whom are women (54%), Costa Rican nationals (87.4%), and aged between 31–50 years (64.2%). 57% of these researchers work in agricultural biotechnology and 20% in human health. Private enterprise is engaged in biotechnology, most companies work on agricultural biotechnology.
The objectives of the National Centre for Biotechnology Innovations (CENIBiot) include improving the competitiveness of the agro-industrial sector. Its mission is to articulate productive and academic sectors in order to scale-up research projects in agro-industrial biotechnology to allow an increase in their productivity. For the period 2006–2010, the principal goals are to improve the links and partnerships between the academic, industrial and government sectors, to develop research and scale up the biotechnological processes, to develop applied research in the biotechnological treatment of agricultural sub-products from tropical fruits, and to contribute to the rational use and management of natural resources and biodiversity, including the reduction of environmental pollution resulting from the intensive fruit production activities. The CENIBiot project is a good example of the cooperation possible between the EU and states from the Latin American and Caribbean region with a link to the BTWC.
Mr Arnoldo Ventura, Special Adviser on Science and Technology, Office of the Prime Minister, Jamaica, painted a (personal) picture in which the poor developing countries are placed at a disadvantage with regard to the evolving threat posed by BW because they lack the necessary science and technology base to develop the means to detect and protect against them. The deliberate introduction of pathogens against agriculture in the Caribbean countries is a particularly acute threat. In general, the poor countries have to rely on outside help, which is circumscribed and haphazard at best. The poor developing countries also cannot rely on international treaties. In particular, the BTWC remains a weak instrument and the failure to strengthen the convention he attributed to the development of large biodefence programmes in the rich countries and the suspicion of offensive weapon programmes these might harbour. The principal threat to poor countries comes from natural disease and the fact that limited resources are transferred to deal with that threat ferments distrust, hopelessness, envy and recrimination. Mr Ventura suggested that the results of scientific analysis should be made widely known in order to lift much of the secrecy, which fosters suspicion, and to develop strategies to assist the poor countries in dealing with the threats and consequences of disease outbreaks. He also called for the strengthening of the international instruments to ensure transparent global oversight of biodefence programmes and the development of clear standards to judge which activities are legitimate and which ones are not. In the development of medical and pharmaceutical measures to counter diseases he noted the contribution traditional medicines derived from the biodiversity of the tropical countries could make.
Discussion
The discussion focussed primarily on the question of how to monitor and control the movement of certain products and technologies. Many of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean lack the equipment to detect whether they pass their borders. Dr Valdez noted the opportunities for technical assistance for States Parties from developed countries under the BTWC. However, there is a great need for education and awareness-raising in the respective societies about the peaceful and non-peaceful uses of the materials.
Dr Strub noted that these questions have also been raised at previous regional seminars organised under the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC and that they are being considered for future joint actions.
In response to comments from several representatives from Caribbean States, Dr Zanders noted that technology transfers do not result solely from the shipment of goods or malicious schemes by criminals or terrorists. He pointed to the natural processes of technology diffusion between societies and certain commercial transactions, such as the sale of a subsidiary of a company located in another country that will transfer all responsibility for oversight and good practice to the country in which the sold subsidiary is located. He also pointed out that the focus should not solely be on human pathogens, but that animal and plant pathogens can pose grave threats to the societies in the region.
The third session looked at the BTWC, its implementation and the ratification process.
Dr Jez Littlewood, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton (UK), provided a detailed overview of the BTWC provisions and the collective activities of States Parties to implement and strengthen the convention. He highlighted the obligations a State Party assumes when joining the treaty as well as the opportunities for assistance and protection and peaceful cooperation that become possible.
Ms Michelle Walker, Head, Legal Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Jamaica, described Jamaica’s experience with the implementation of the BTWC. She stated that as a matter of policy Jamaica does not develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain microbial agents or delivery means for such agents for purposes prohibited under the BTWC.
Jamaica does not have specific legislation to implement the BTWC, but Cabinet approval for issuing drafting instructions to prepare such legislation will be sought in the near future. Notwithstanding, there exist several laws that can be used to prevent and prohibit BW, including the Customs Act, the Terrorism prevention Act, the Animals (Diseases and Importation) Act, and other acts relating to quarantine, food and drugs, and public health. These acts also enable Jamaica to monitor and address the spread of disease. The country has several dedicated services to prepare and execute contingency plans to swiftly deal with outbreaks.
She concluded by noting that Jamaica is also Party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and that it participates in technology exchanges through international bodies, including UNCLAD, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, the WHO, FAO and PAHO.
Ms Angela Woodward, Legal Coordinator at the Bioweapons Prevention Project for possible assistance programmes under the EU Joint Action, explained the technical aspects of ratification and accession and summarised the obligations States Parties to the BTWC assume in order to transpose the prohibitions in the convention into national legislation. She also highlighted the legal and legislative implementation assistance the EU can make available to States Party to the BTWC that request such assistance.
Discussion
The discussion focussed essentially on the weaknesses of the BTWC regime, whose causes were clarified for the audience. Dr Kraatz-Wadsack pointed out that the BTWC does not exist in isolation and that other international initiatives contribute to the strengthening of the regime, such as the UN counter-terrorism resolution of September 2006; the UN counter-terrorism implementation task force which is charged with working on, inter alia, preventing WMD production and attacks; UN Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism; UN biological incident database (helps to identify whether events are accidents, deliberate attack etc); and UN cooperation with IAEA, OPCW, Interpol, WHO, etc., on counter-terrorism issues.
The final session turned to the public health dimension of preventing BW.
Mr Alan Jorge Bojanic, Representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Costa Rica made some comments from the panel. He emphasised that animal diseases can cause significant economic impact for states. FAO deals mainly with food security and food safety, and the impact of animal diseases on human health as many of them are zoonotic and can cross over to humans. In considering responses to these transboundary diseases it works together with WHO and OIE. As the FAO’s primary goal is to control disease at the source, it runs programmes on disease surveillance and response. In this respect it also works together with the OIE on certain animal and health disease surveillance programmes. PAHO has a reference laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease. He noted that there are certain non-binding regulations to undertake joint actions between those organisations to respond to disease outbreaks.
Dr Carlos Samayoa, representative of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO) in Costa Rica, noted that PAHO was established even before the WHO. WHO has been involved in many CBW protection and assistance efforts and has contributed to efforts to control BW developed by others too (UN processes, first Pugwash conference, etc). Latin America and the Caribbean are poorly equipped to respond to sudden demands generated by bioterrorism or new acute diseases. Therefore there is a need for collaborative efforts to respond to disease outbreaks.
Dr Samayoa did not consider the deliberate use of CW or BW likely due to the international agreements prohibiting these weapons, but should it happen then the impact would be devastating. Many organisations, including WHO, are able to provide assistance. He noted World Health Assembly document WHA55.16 (18 May 2002) which enables a global public response to natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological or chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect health. The WHO has boosted its surveillance and response capability as a consequence and is assisting Member States in preparing to respond to public health emergencies, including natural epidemics. To counter bioterrorism, he believed it is important to have early detection and monitoring, rapid laboratory diagnostics and tools and procedures for epidemiological investigations as well as the implementation of control measures. It is absolutely essential to have a multi-sectoral approach. Projections indicate that health systems would collapse after one week if there is no comprehensive multi-sectoral response.
WHO considers strategic partnerships to be very important in order to prepare responses to outbreaks. Doctors in many countries may not be familiar with diseases used in an attack (e.g., the 2001 anthrax outbreak). WHO has created disease-specific networks to provide advice. Furthermore, it calls for a global partnership to deal with cases of the deliberate use of chemical or biological agents involving experts and other dedicated international organisations.
Dr Gastón Funes, Deputy Head of the Regional Activities Department, World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) covered the relationship between the work of the OIE and the BTWC, specifically with respect to animal health and food security. The OIE was founded in 1924 in response to a rinderpest epidemic in Belgium, to help prevent spread of animal diseases between countries. Its responsibilities have grown over the years, beyond animal disease to public health, such as with respect to zoonotic potential of animal pathogens. The head of veterinary services in a Member State tends to be the contact point for the OIE. The OIE’s current strategic plan relates to preventing animal diseases being used in a bioterrorist attack, such as attack on animal populations with diseases that could be transmitted to humans, or which could severely impact on agriculture. Of particular concern is that as a consequence of globalization emerging and reemerging diseases can spread very fast. More specifically, it has become much easier to introduce exotic pathogens into a particular region. New diseases of potential concern to the Central America and Caribbean region include foot and mouth disease, classical swine fever, avian influenza and New World Screwworm. Some of these diseases are of particular relevance for wild animal populations.
The OIE has undertaken a number of initiatives to establish early warning and detection systems, rapid notification mechanisms and rapid response systems. It invests in the improvement of governance and veterinary policies, capacity building, and the establishment of quality centres for support to countries.
The OIE has supported the BTWC since 2003 through the participation in meetings of experts organised by the States party to the convention and other relevant meetings. It has produced materials and information relating to the treaty; and promotes global surveillance and preparedness for rapid response; which should cover the introduction of non-domestic animals; animal diseases and zoonosis; and adherence to international animal health standards.
Dr Canice Nolan, Head of Food Safety, Health and Consumer Affairs, European Commission Delegation in the USA described that the EU has set up several programmes, systems and networks to deal with epidemiological events or cases of the deliberate uses of chemical or biological agents. Since May 2005 the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is operational. The EU runs a Programme of Cooperation in Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Public Health). The European Commission also supports a number of research programmes to develop technologies and knowledge related to health security. The EU also undertakes Generic Preparedness and Response Planning which seeks to introduce a variety of improvements relating to information management, communications, scientific advice and cross-sector preparedness. Dr Nolan also referred to the new EU Health Programme for 2007-2013 and the 7th Research Framework Programme (FP 7) that seek to promote greater health security for the EU citizens and stimulate research in areas relating to health and security.
Discussion
No questions arose from these presentations.
Dr Zanders concluded the day’s proceedings by noting that the BTWC must be viewed in a much broader context than just preventing state BW programmes and development or use of BW by terrorists. Improving public health systems is an important component. In undertaking such measures, states are also taking action to respond to deliberate disease attacks. The BTWC contains requirements for preventive measures on state level (laws and regulations) as well as responsibilities of individuals, such as raising awareness among different constituencies within society.
In the evening Mr Tomas Abadía Vicente, Head of the European Commission Delegation in Costa Rica, hosted a reception, which enabled the seminar participants to continue their discussions in an informal setting.
C. Plenary discussion sessions
The programme for the second day envisaged three plenary sessions to discuss in detail three major themes, namely Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility; Regional security issues and the BTWC; and Ratification and accession to the BTWC: Legal and administrative requirements.Theme 1: ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’
The discussion centred mainly around two themes, namely the types of oversight mechanisms that should be adopted and the organisation of technology transfers.
The concern was expressed that for poor developing countries the cost of setting up oversight mechanisms for biotechnology activities could be prohibitive. In response it was stated that the cost is likely to vary from country to country depending on the size of the biotechnology sector and the types of biological research that are being undertaken. It was noted that the question is pertinent not just for developing countries: some small EU countries face similar challenges. It would be useful to have some statistics comparing how states of similar size and scale of biotechnology have organised their oversight.
It was also noted that certain actions, notably raising issue awareness among relevant constituencies, need not cost a lot. Having knowledge about the dangers relating to the potential diversion of technologies for malicious purposes constitutes a basic building bloc for all oversight mechanisms. Oversight is also a question of cooperation between different departments and agencies, as the experience with the implementation of the CWC has demonstrated. In follow-up to the CWC, the Parties to the BTWC agreed at the 6th Review Conference to designate a national contact point.
The issue of possible loss of commercial propriety information as a consequence of implementing oversight mechanisms was raised. The implementation of the BTWC is about having sufficient information to determine whether illegitimate activities are being carried out. The question was raised whether the countries in the region practice licensing requirements. Licensing enables to establish a database of companies and facilities that are relevant to monitor and it enables the verification of whether the activities correspond to the terms of the license. There are also other mechanisms in operation, such as those to ensure quality control and public health standards, which can add to the oversight mechanism.
The topic of technology transfers was also discussed in the context of oversight. In particular, the question was raised whether a state can be knowledgeable whether such transfers are taking place. It was noted that technology transfers are part of the BTWC. States Parties, however, have a responsibility to ensure that the transfers do not contribute to proliferation, which highlights the importance of national legislation, including export controls. In addition, it was explained that relevant technology transfers should be understood as being broader than transferring pathogens between biotechnology facilities. Other areas include the development of the scientific and technological infrastructure within the state, developing monitoring capabilities to facilitate quick response (which include activities as diverse as customs training and public health monitoring systems). In other words, building up a state’s oversight capacity through international cooperation also involves technology transfers.
During the discussion Chile noted that its implementation legislation for the BTWC is not as advanced as the legislation implementing the CWC. It hopes to be able to model the BTWC legislation upon the legislation for the CWC. Chile did comply with the reporting requirements under the confidence-building measures of the BTWC, which it considers to be an essential tool for sharing information between countries.
Theme 2: ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’
Natural outbreaks of disease were considered a greater threat than that posed by deliberate disease. Other areas of concern are cross border movements of people and hazardous chemicals and toxic waste, and environmental threats in general. Of great concern was the generally low level of response preparedness to incidental release of toxicants or pathogens. Many of the threat factors were felt to fall outside the scope of the BTWC.
The discussion moved on to topics such as whether the commercialisation of substances like botulinum toxin contributes to the threat posed by terrorists or criminals and to a number of diseases that could affect the agricultural activities in the region. The latter topic led to discussion of inter-state and regional cooperation in disease monitoring and reporting. National capacities are in general weak and can easily be overcome in the case of a major outbreak. The countries rely on outside resources, which can be provided by international organisations (WHO/PAHO, OIE, etc.) or individual countries like the USA. It was also noted that certain diseases that were eradicated from the Hemisphere are still being monitored in order to enable rapid response.
Theme 3: ‘Ratification and accession to the BTWC: Legal and administrative requirements’
Trinidad and Tobago noted that a recommendation for accession to the BTWC was accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The representative is now preparing a note recommending accession to be put before the Cabinet. She welcomed the discussions at this seminar, which have highlighted the importance of national implementation. She received a lot of useful information and acquired practical insights into the relevant issues. The seminar also gave her information to put to the (Parliamentary) opposition and cabinet officials in case they query the accession recommendation.
Ms Woodward highlighted some aspects relating to implementation and ratification/accession by way of introduction.
Some questions relating to the absence of verification and oversight mechanisms in the BTWC were raised. Other questions related to why some states have not joined the BTWC. There are multiple reasons, which, according to Mr Tim Caughley of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (Geneva), is a matter that the Implementation Support Unit of the BTWC (agreed by the States Parties at the 6th Review Conference) will have to consider when developing a strategy to promote universalisation.
The absence of Guyana and Haiti was noted several times. During the discussions, representatives from regional States Parties and regional organisations were urged to undertake steps to encourage Guyana’s and Haiti’s ratification of the convention. It was noted that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) may be a useful regional organisation to promote universality of the BTWC and national implementation cooperation. (Both Haiti and Guyana will receive the seminar folder and report. )
The EU offer of assistance to States Parties to the BTWC that seek to adopt or improve national legislation to implement the Convention was discussed at length. (The background note and assistance request form were included in the seminar folder.) Under the terms of the EU Joint Action, experts from EU Member States are available to, for example, explore and discuss in cooperation with national experts from the requesting State Party approaches to implementing the treaty obligations in national legislation and other measures or to comment on draft legislation. In addition, experts from EU Member States can undertake technical assistance visits to States Parties to cooperate with the requesting States officials in drafting legislation to implement the BTWC.
The importance of adequate national implementation legislation is underscored by the obligations of all States under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). At the 6th Review Conference of the BTWC (20 November–8 December 2006), the States Parties reaffirmed the importance of Article IV of the Convention (which contains the national implementation obligation) and decided that the first of the four annual meetings to be held between the 6th and 7th Review Conferences will look into ‘ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions’. This meeting is provisionally scheduled for August 2007.
D. Closing session
In his meeting conclusions Mr Tim Caughley congratulated the Council of the EU for its sustained joint action in support of the BTWC. He added that the issues canvassed at these regional seminars are not merely technical ones. They have fundamental connections with regional security, matters of health (public health, agricultural health, animal health, food safety, etc.) and with progress in science and technology. He emphasised the importance of national implementation and pointed to the overlap with UN Security Council Resolution 1540. He concluded by referring to an important component of EU policy, namely effective multilateralism in relation to the strengthening of the international norms against WMD through universalisation of the relevant treaties, improving levels of national implementation and facilitating regional and international cooperation. The BTWC norm is strong in Latin America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, he noted that one hundred percent adherence is a worthwhile target for regional solidarity and Trinidad and Tobago seems well on the way to party status. Continuing representations to the other States not yet party to the Convention are in order through national and regional channels coupled with offers of practical assistance and the sharing of experiences and benefits.Mr Alejandro Solano, Foreign Policy Director a.i. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica believed it was a great honour for Costa Rica to be chosen to host this seminar. He confirmed that Costa Rica is firmly committed to promoting related issues. He hoped that the seminar will lead to greater universalisation and more effective implementation of the BTWC and reduce the risk of threat to peace and security.
Mr Tomas Abadía Vicente, Head of the European Commission Delegation in Costa Rica, thanked the Costa Rican government for a warm reception and cooperation in hosting the seminar. He considered that the meeting has contributed to greater awareness of multilateralism in biological disarmament. He noted the excellent participation in terms of number of participants and quality of discussion. He especially thanked the representative of Trinidad and Tobago for her participation and expressed the support of all in the accession process. He concluded by referring to the opportunities for collaboration between the EU and the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, citing CENIBiot as a prime example.
Dr Andreas Strub concluded that the workshop has helped the EU to better understand states’ views on issues related to the BTWC. He took note of the participants’ interest in assistance on export controls, technology transfers, customs training, and so on. He particularly welcomed the concrete interest in the technical assistance offered under the EU Joint Action expressed during and in the margins of the seminar and encouraged participants to discuss the offer with officials in the respective capitals. He also asked participants to keep EU informed about the types of collaboration and assistance that they may require and possible follow-up activities at the regional level.