Report of the regional seminar for the Middle East
I. Introduction
The regional meeting in support of the universalisation of theTwo States not party to the BTWC were represented: Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
Eleven regional States party to the BTWC attended: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Representatives from ten International Organisations participated: Biological and
Twelve EU Member States were represented: France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (Presidency), Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as Council of the European Union and the European Commission.
II. Meeting proceedings
A. Introductions
Ambassador Andrej Capuder (Slovenia; Presidency of the European Union) welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU presidency, and outlined Slovenia’s priorities as Presidency of the European Union (EU). He also underlined the importance of the Mediterranean area to the EU.Mr Emanuele Farruggia, Director for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Directorate General for Multilateral Political Affairs and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy, welcomed the participants on behalf of the host country. He emphasised that the BTWC is one of the corner-stones of international arms control and non-proliferation and has become a tool to promote international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities and to prevent bioterrorism. Security and stability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region is one of Italy’s primary concerns. He stressed that, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean framework of the Barcelona process, Italy and its EU partners are committed to the long-term goal of a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction. He next turned to the importance of a universal BTWC. While recognising the special security environment in the Middle East and the many challenges the region faces, he noted that the region would not be exempt from the disastrous consequences of biological warfare or bioterrorism and that therefore the countries in the Middle East also have a stake in the universality of the BTWC and promotion of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).
Dr Andreas Strub, Coordinator, Office of the Personal Representative to the High Representative for Non-Proliferation, welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU Member States and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Mr Javier Solana, and thanked the Slovenian Ambassador, as well as the Italian authorities, for their support to the regional seminar. He announced that the Personal Representative of HR Solana, Ms. Giannella, would be present to draw the conclusions of the meeting from an EU perspective, on the following day.
The EU, he stressed, was increasingly assuming political responsibility for addressing the evolving security threats. When the EU heads of state adopted the EU security strategy, they also adopted a strategy to prevent WMD proliferation. The motivation for organising this regional seminar in support of the universalisation of the BTWC is deeply rooted in these EU Strategies. Both documents are based on three principles, namely effective multilateralism, prevention, cooperation, and partnership.
He underlined that the EU is committed to strengthening multilateral systems, including the United Nations. Effective multilateralism is reflected in the EU’s political and financial contribution to efforts to universalise and support the national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the BTWC, the IAEA, etc.
The EU’s emphasis is on prevention. In doing so, the EU seeks to address the complexities and root causes of the threats. In the case of the BW threat, the EU contribution is multifaceted and combines many policy tools. Prevention is also reflected in the EU’s diplomatic actions e.g. to find a peaceful solution for the Middle East and other regions. The strengthening of the BTWC requires cooperation with other states and international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO). Cooperation also needs to extend to areas like export controls of dual-use goods and technologies, and technical assistance with regard to border controls, training of customs officers, and similar practical measures.
With regard to cooperation and partnership, Dr Strub noted that the EU’s activities cover many regions, including the Middle East. He recalled the EU’s co-sponsorship of the regional workshop in support of the implementation of UNSC 1540 in Amman, Jordan in 2007 and the CWC regional seminar for Mediterranean Countries in Rome in 2006. He also noted the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation in the 1995 Barcelona declaration and its objective of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. He announced the Seminar on Middle East Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to be organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies in June 2008.
A tool used by the EU is the ‘non-proliferation clause’, which is inserted into all cooperation and association agreements with third countries as a confidence-building measure and an opportunity to engage in a dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation issues. The clause is included in agreements with over 90 countries, including members from the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Middle Eastern States. The so-called neighbourhood Action Plans (which have been concluded with the Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority) also include non-proliferation elements.
Momentum has been created by the 6th Review Conference of the BTWC to promote national implementation. The EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC signals both a financial commitment and a desire for action by the EU to promote BTWC universality as well as to improve its implementation. It has a double objective. First, it aims to raise awareness about the importance of BTWC universality. It encourages States that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to the convention. Second, the EU offers legal or legislative implementation assistance to States Parties that request it.
Dr Strub also announced the adoption by the Council on 14 April 2008 a Joint Action in support of the World Health Organization (WHO) allowing to carry out projects in the area of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. The EU Member States are currently also discussing a follow-on Joint Action in support of the BTWC, which is expected ensure continuation of efforts in the area of national implementation and universality of the convention, as well as enlarge the scope of cooperation in the area s of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the BTWC intersessional process.
B. Summary of presentations
The first session dealt with regional security issues as related to the BTWC and the relevance of universal adherence.Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project and entrusted with the technical implementation of the EU Joint Action, offered a brief summary of the BTWC and the status of the norm against BW. Worldwide, the BTWC has now 161 States Parties. Thirty-four States still remain outside the convention. Of the 19 States in the Middle East, 15 are party to the convention.
Middle Eastern countries can clearly benefit from adhering to the BTWC: it creates additional security and enables participation in international/multilateral cooperation, including with regard to the protection against diseases as well as biological attacks. Development benefits can also be achieved through Article X of the convention by facilitating capacity building of public health system and promoting the underlying bio-research capability.
Ambassador Georgi Avramchev, Chairman of the 2008 BTWC Meetings of Experts and States Parties, noted that at the 6th Review Conference (2006) the States Parties undertook a specific plan to enhance universality of the BTWC, which included promotion of the convention through bi- and multilateral contacts as well as regional initiatives, the notification of the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of a national contact point, and the reporting of activities to the ISU, in particular those relating to the promotion of universality. The Chairman of the annual meetings of States Parties must provide an annual progress report on universalisation. Based on contacts with States not yet party to the convention, the Chairman is also able to report on the status of progress on ratification or accession.
He highlighted the relevancy of the BTWC to collective security and as a forum for cooperation in meeting international security obligations, and the role it can play in strengthening national public health, veterinary, agricultural and emergency-response capacities. He noted that the ISU can provide information and advice on sensitising national policy makers to the importance of the BTWC and that assistance from States Parties regarding national implementation is available.
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (New York) explained that Resolution 1540 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 2004 and reiterated by resolution 1673 in 2006. It identifies the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials as a threat to international peace and security and addresses the various aspects of proliferation and its relation to non-State actors, particularly in an integrated manner. It establishes binding obligations for all States regarding the implementation of legislative and enforcement measures to prevent and deter non-state actors from gaining access to such items, and to secure, account for and physically protect these items, control their export, transport or cross-border shipment, as well as services related to such activities. At the same time, the resolution makes clear that it does not conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the existing international disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.
The 1540 Committee, which oversees implementation of the resolution, has received to date 149 first reports; 43 States still have to meet this obligation. Implementation of the resolution poses difficulties to some States, and that other aspects of implementation will represent similar challenges. In order to meet this challenge, States in a position to do so have been encouraged to offer assistance in response to specific requests.
Discussion
The first part of the discussion focussed on the lack of a verification regime for the BTWC, which stands in contrast to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Dr Zanders noted that verification mechanisms were dropped during the negotiation of the BTWC (1968–71) and that States Parties have repeatedly tried to add verification tools to the treaty since its entry into force in 1975. The most comprehensive attempt to negotiate a legally binding protocol by the Ad Hoc Group failed in 2001. One consequence of the lack of a verification regime is the absence of an international organisation to oversee the implementation of the convention and monitor and enforce compliance. At the 6th Review Conference (2006) the States Parties agreed to set up an Implementation Support Unit (ISU). Mr Richard Lennane, Head of the ISU, stated that some States Parties view the ISU as a first step towards a permanent international organisation. However, a decision on the continuation of its mandate will be taken at the 7th Review Conference in 2011. The ISU does not undertake any verification activities and is not in a position to comment on the desirability of a verification mechanism.
The representative of Libya thanked the EU for organising the regional seminar. He noted the steps Libya has undertaken over the past few years with regard to the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The country undertakes numerous projects and organises workshops on the national and international levels. It has now set up a permanent national committee to deal with arms control and disarmament in this respect. Among other things, it deploys activities in several sectors, including farming, health, scientific activities for peaceful purposes, bioethics, and so on. It is also developing national legislation to implement the BTWC. It has also set up a website in support of these activities with the aim to promote transparency. Dr Strub acknowledged the efforts undertaken by Libya and invited the Libyan representative to provide further information on these activities.
The second session focussed on the opportunities for scientific and technological cooperation under the BTWC.
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York) highlighted the benefits biotechnology can bring with regard to new pharmaceuticals, advances in medicine, agriculture, materials and computing. However, these same advances applied in the military sphere can also contribute to the development of effective designer BW. In addition, since more people in a growing number of disciplines have access to the knowledge and expertise, the risk of misuse of biotechnology also increases. It has become a matter of urgency to understand this risk, and develop ways of dealing with it. The provisions of the BTWC offer a number of tools to reduce the risk of misuse while promoting the legitimate application of biotechnology. The UN is very conscious of these matters. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has referred several times to the dangers of weapon applications of the advances in the life sciences. The UN General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006) supports his proposal to bring together, within the framework of the United Nations, the major biotechnology stakeholders, including industry, the scientific community, civil society and governments, into a common programme aimed at ensuring that biotechnology’s advances are for the public good, with due respect to the basic international norms on intellectual property rights. She concluded by noting that the BTWC remains a relevant legal framework for protection against bio-proliferation. At the same time, it can help with the promotion of cooperation and technology exchanges.
Mr Decio Ripandelli, Director, International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), Trieste, Italy, presented the ICGEB as a concrete example of cooperation in the fields of biology and biotechnology. The ICGEB is an international, intergovernmental organisation conceived as a centre of excellence for advanced research and training in genetic engineering and biotechnology, with special regard to the needs of the developing world. It strengthens the research capability of its members through training and funding programmes and advisory services, and represents a comprehensive approach to promoting biotechnology internationally. Its membership consists of 77 signatory countries, of which 57 are full Member States.
Between 1991 and 2007 the ICGEB developed a range of activities in the Middle East, including 27 courses and workshops, 47 collaborative research projects, and 61 fellowships for a total of 103 trainee/years. A total of 5.5 million US$ was committed.
Discussion
Most of the discussion focussed on the work of the ICGEB. The representative of Libya queried how his country could contribute to the initiative. Mr Ripandelli replied that the Libyan Government had made a formal application in 2006, which was approved by the Board of Governors. Libya must now submit its ratification so as to open up the different programmes to which it may wish to subscribe.
Mr Ripandelli explained that the ICGEB process started very slowly and that the countries that joined first (Egypt, Turkey and Tunisia) are benefiting more that the newer members. He added that there is also a need to make the members realise their potential. The ICGEB undertakes outreach activities to specific countries to have the different stakeholders in a Member State (e.g., Ministries of Health, Education, etc.) actively engaged in the process.
The first afternoon session placed the BTWC in the broader context of public health and disease surveillance.
Dr Caroline Planté, Sub-Regional Representative in Brussels, World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), presented an overview of the traditional and new OIE missions. She next discussed issues related to the control over trans-boundary (zoonotic) diseases. Besides the fact that animal and plant pathogens can cause great economic harm, some 60% of animal pathogens can transfer to humans (zoonosis). About 75% of emerging diseases can jump from animal to man. 80% of agents having a potential bioterrorist application are zoonotic pathogens. Most human diseases originate from animal sources.
International travel and commerce means that diseases cross borders and move easily across the globe. Through agro-terrorism pathogens can be deliberately introduced into a given region and has the potential for economic disasters. This knowledge calls for effective export and import controls in order to limit the potential spread of diseases and the development of veterinary services. Furthermore, there is a distinct need for early warning, detection and notification. The OIE provides training and assistance for capacity building in this area, and works in partnership with other international organisations, including the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the WHO. With the FAO and the WHO the OIE is setting up a joint early warning system.
Dr Ottorino Cosivi, Project Leader, Preparedness for Deliberate Epidemics, BioRisk Reduction of Dangerous Pathogens at the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response of the World Health Organisation (WHO), reviewed the threat the WHO currently deals with, including emerging diseases, international crises and humanitarian emergencies, threats posed by the deliberate release of biological, chemical and radiological agents, and environmental disasters. The 2007 World Health Day focussed on international health security. He then elaborated on the role of the International Health Regulations that were adopted in 2005, which set new standards for all WHO Member States (in force 2007; by 2012 all Member States should have core capacity in place to implement the IHR). The IHR creates a framework/mechanism for reporting of outbreaks, for assistance if requested and for capacity development when needed. The objective is to contain the outbreak and reduce the time for emergency response. It is important to recognise that outbreaks and disease spread across today’s transportation systems (ports, airports, etc.).
Dr Cosivi then described the WHO’s outbreak response mechanism, which involves information gathering, verification, risk assessment, and, if agreed, the provision of in-country assistance. WHO prepares guidelines, specific for diseases, and provides guidance documents related to global pandemic preparedness. It also offers advice on public health preparedness including for dealing with BW threats. From the WHO’s perspective, the public health response needs to deal with any incident, whether natural or malicious.
In addition, WHO has developed laboratory biosafety and biosecurity guidelines. There remains a need to raise awareness in the scientific community regarding dual-use issues relating to the manipulation of pathogens.
Dr Ahmed El-Idrissi, Animal Health Service, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) defined food security as the condition when all people, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Shocks to food security can be caused by conflicts, natural disasters, pests and diseases, HIV/AIDS and climate change. In 1994 the FAO set up EMPRES (Emergency Prevention System for Trans-boundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases Prevention System) to reduce the impact of diseases on food security. More recently the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) was launched to improve the protein food security and incomes of developing countries, safeguard the world livestock industry from repeat shocks of infectious disease epidemics, and promote safe trade in livestock and animal products.
Discussion
The subsequent discussion focussed on how the respective organisations promote their programmes and collaborate on certain issue areas. Some participants from the Middle East also queried about the specific implementation of the programmes in the Middle Eastern region. Several participants noted that there was already a remarkable level of cooperation among States in the Middle East to deal with the threat of disease.
The second afternoon session focussed on regional cooperation with regard to threats posed by pathogens.
Mr Albrecht Werner of the Health Threat Unit in the European Commission described the EU approach to biological threats to public health. The EU has set up a Community Network for epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases. It contains a component on epidemiological surveillance and one consisting of an early warning and response system. The Network also advises on draft measures for binding decisions by the European Commission.
The Health Security Committee, whose mandate was renewed in 2007, deals in three major areas: general preparedness; deliberate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents; and influenza. It operates in the areas of risk assessment and management. It serves as an exchange of information on health threats resulting from the deliberate release of CBRN agents; shares experience on preparedness and crisis management, advises on preparedness and emergency planning, facilitates coordination on the EU and international levels, and cooperates with international organisations such as the WHO. The Commission also participates in the Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG), which is an informal, international partnership of G7+ countries to strengthen health preparedness and response globally. GHSAG has also established a rapid alert system among the members.
Finally, the EU also set up the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), which will progressively take over the funding, support and oversight of surveillance schemes and information and training. It provides scientific and technical support to decision-making in relevant areas, advises the Commission and competent authorities in EU Members responsible for the surveillance, and plays a keys role in the co-ordination of the surveillance component of the Community Network for the Epidemiological Surveillance and Control.
Dr Adel Belbeisi, Director of the Jordan Centre for Disease Control, outlined the MECIDS (Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease Surveillance) programme, which brings together Egyptian, Israel, Jordan and Palestinian health professionals to promote regional cooperation on infectious diseases surveillance and associated research and training. Its aims are the reduction of the region’s vulnerability to disease outbreaks, whether natural, or caused by a biological weapon and the building of trust and confidence among health professionals. Among the general objectives of the initiatives are the establishment and improvement a surveillance system for food-borne disease outbreaks, the establishing a laboratory base surveillance system and a a platform for data collection, management, sharing, and analysis of infectious disease, as well as capacity building. Dr Belbeisi then gave a detailed overview of successes in the collaboration.
Dr Philippe Stroot, European Biosafety Association (EBSA) and Xibios (Belgium), outlined the regulatory framework for the transfer of biological materials and detailed the responsibilities of many parties involved in such a transfer (consignor, carrier, consignee, governmental and international agencies, etc.). He explained that depending on the category of infectious substances, the shipment requirements differ considerably. He also noted that there are significant gaps in existing regulations and procedures, most notably that there is no effective risk control over transportation. Certain sensitive biological substances may be shipped undeclared and there is no physical control over the transported goods. It is therefore not possible to detect illegal or falsely labelled biological materials. He concluded that while there is effective control over the possession of such materials, transfer of biological materials appears to be the less effectively controlled element of biorisk management.
Mr Zeljko Jerkic, External Relations Division, Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) presented an overview of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and highlighted those initiatives relating to the universalisation and implementation of the convention and the programmes promoting international cooperation and cooperation in the field of assistance and protection. He concluded with an overview of the OPCW–EU partnership projects.
Discussion
The discussion initially focussed on the apparently limited controls that exist on the transfer of biological materials. There is no rational explanation as to why the control on pathogens declared under Category B remains wanting while much more stringent measures have been adopted in other areas of biosafety and biosecurity.
The Middle Eastern participants entered into a debate on the need for greater cooperation among Arab countries regarding disease detection and surveillance. During the debate, however, it also emerged that a number of cooperative programmes are already under way and in the process of expanding or intensifying. Several queries were formulated about the opportunities to have centres or offices located in different Middle Eastern capitals. International organisations, such as the FAO, have local offices, which can be contacted for expanding regional detection and surveillance systems.
Dr Zanders offered the conclusions for the day, during which he integrated the different topics discussed into the core seminar goal of promoting the universalisation of the BTWC in all its aspects.
In the evening the European Union hosted a reception, which enabled the seminar participants to continue their discussions in an informal setting.
The second day of the seminar dealt primarily with the implementation of the BTWC.
Mr Leonard Blazeby, Legal Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross, outlined the obligations of States under the BTWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. There is increased concern that the advances in biotechnology can be used to improve the acquisition and the use of biological weapons. In addition, the threat of deliberate use of disease is no longer limited to states as an expanding range of people have access to such agents. The BTWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 offer a number of tools to prevent the misuse of biology and biotechnology. National implementation legislation domesticates the prohibitions of the BTWC. UNSC Resolution 1540 focuses more specifically on the criminalisation of the illicit use of pathogens and dual-use equipment, and orders all states to develop and maintain border controls and other areas of law enforcement to combat illicit transfers of such items.
Dr Nasser Al-Ansari, Hamad Medical Corporation, Qatar outlined Qatar’s experience with the implementation of the BTWC. In 2004 the government of Qatar established a National Committee for the prohibition of weapons to deal with all issues related to the disarmament, including the BTWC, CWC and NPT. This Committee consists of the Chairman and Vice Chairman from Ministry of Defence and members from several ministries, including Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Industry and Energy, Public Health, Municipality and Agriculture, and the Environment. Representatives from the Cabinet Public Hospitals (Hamad Medical Corporation) and Customs complete its composition. The secretary is located within the Ministry of Defence. The Committee meets monthly and submits quarterly activity reports to the Cabinet.
The Committee has a number of functions, including advise to the Government, implementation of the treaties, drafting of implementation legislation, and so on. With respect to the BTWC, it also prepares the CBM submissions. In 2007 it prompted the Government to promulgate legislation implementing the CWC; now it will undertake to prepare legislation to prohibit biological weapons.
Mr Redouane Houssaini, Head, Department of the Principal Agencies of the United Nations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Morocco, welcomed the EU’s initiative to hold the seminar to promote the BTWC in the Middle East. He used the opportunity to express Morocco’s commitment to the convention and to a Middle Eastern zone free of WMD.
Morocco considers the BTWC as one of the fundamental disarmament pillars. It signed the convention in 1972 and ratified it in 2002. Even before its ratification, Morocco participated as an observer in all the Review Conferences. Morocco submitted its first CBM declaration in 2005 and a second time in 2006. It also submitted the initial report under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Mr Husseini formally stated that Morocco does not have any bio-defence programmes. It is in the process of constructing two high-containment laboratories, one of which shall serve the Medical Service of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. The second one will be specialized in viral infections. Morocco has adopted several laws in the 1920s and 1930s relating to the possession and transfer of weapons and munitions, which are now being applied to biological and
Mr Husseini concluded with a reference to the need for regional cooperation and technical assistance under the BTWC.
Discussion
The discussion started off with the question whether ‘use’ of biological weapons is prohibited under the terms of the BTWC. The Office of the Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD recalled that in the final documents of the 4th and 6th Review Conferences (1996 and 2006 respectively) expanded the understanding of Article I of the BTWC to cover ‘use’. Mr Blazeby argued in favour of an amendment. He added that the number of parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol is much lower than that to the BTWC, meaning that there are a significant number of States Parties to the BTWC that are not legally committed to the ban on use.
A second aspect of the discussion related to the prevention of criminals or terrorists resorting to biological agents and toxins. As part of the transposition of the BTWC obligations into national legislation, Mr Blazeby noted that some States have adopted language in which the time frame during which an offence is committed in taken into account to determine the gravity of the offence. A related question involved the international response in case of the detection of a violation of the BTWC. Mr Lennane of the ISU replied that the current procedures involve the UN Security Council if the issue involves more than one State. However, if the incident happens with a single country, then the issue becomes a matter of internal law enforcement. Dr Zanders added that it is important for governments to plan their response well in advance of an incident, as the measures taken will differ considerable depending on the assessment whether an outbreak is natural, unnatural or deliberate. Mr Werner confirmed that it is very difficult to get individual departments involved in such preparations, yet a number of cases indicate its absolute necessity. Dr Kraatz-Wadsack made reference to the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism to investigate alleged use of biological weapons. A representative from a Middle Eastern Country noted the need for technical assistance regarding diagnostics so that BTWC States Parties have the capability for rapid detection. This may be an area for cooperation with the EU.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders next presented an overview of the EU’s experience with national implementation assistance under the current Joint Action. He outlined the requirements of Article IV of the BTWC and the additional understandings agreed at the 6th Review Conference.
Mr Richard Lennane, Head of the BTWC Implementation Support Unit, reviewed the mandate of the ISU, which consists of administrative support for the BTWC meetings, facilitation of communication among States Parties and with relevant organizations, support of national implementation efforts, the administration of CBMs, support of universalisation activities and support with regard to the implementation of decisions and recommendations of Sixth Review Conference. He also discussed the types of assistance that are possible under the BTWC and explained how the ISU could be of assistance to communicate requests and offers of assistance and its possible mediation roles.
Discussion
The Participants from the Middle East had many questions regarding the role and functions of the ISU, which were discussed in some detail. It was noted that the ISU is a tool of the BTWC States Parties and that the States Parties determine the scope of its mandate. The need to have documents, guides and other materials available in more languages than just English and French was expressed. Ms Giannella, Personal Representative for Non-Proliferation, noted that the EU may take up the idea of supporting the publication of guides in different languages.
Some participants asked questions about opportunities for EU assistance. Ms Giannella described the implementation assistance the EU provided to Nigeria and Peru under the current EU Joint Action, which involved the sending of teams of EU legal experts to the respective capitals to assist with the drafting of legislation. While the current EU Joint Action will expire at the end of April 2008, a next Joint Action in support of the BTWC is likely to contain similar assistance objectives as well as assistance respecting for the preparation and submission of CBMs.
C. Concluding session
Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack summarized the main elements of each of the sessions and underscored the relevancy of the link of each of the topics to the universalisation of the BTWC.Ms Annalisa Giannella, the EU High Representative’s Personal Representative on non-proliferation, thanked the participants for their active participation in the seminar. She noted the importance of the Middle East to the EU and reiterated that the objective of the WMD Free Zone for ME was part of the Barcelona declaration. She noted the requests for cooperation and appeal for greater EU involvement in the region. Closer cooperation is needed with respect to the BTWC and may lead to concrete assistance in areas like national implementation and the CBM submissions. With respect to the calls for an international organisation and a verification regime for the BTWC, she noted that the EU Member States which could support both ideas, has chosen to work in a pragmatic way, in order to strengthen the BTWC as much as possible under the current conditions.