In the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), ‘transfer’ means the transmittal of biological weapons or BW-related dual-use materials and technology to any recipient whatsoever, domestically or internationally by export or import.

Article III requires each State Party not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I. The risk of acquisition by terrorists adds to the importance of addressing the transfer issue. To give full effect to this requirement, provisions may need to be made for a mandatory licensing system to help ensure that central authorities can track the movement of specified materials, such as lists of agents and toxins, and items of equipment, for instance, certain types of fermenters and downstream processing equipment. This should certainly cover exports and may need to cover imports and internal domestic transfers as well, if it can be shown that the resulting burden is justified by the potential benefits sought.

Transfer monitoring and export control regulations would need to:

• be defined by lists of biological agents and toxins, and of related genetic material, and of equipment subject to licensing prior to export, and possibly other modes of transfer.
• contain a 'catch all' clause that would require any person transferring such items to another to seek a licence where he/she suspects or has been informed by government that the item concerned may be for use in an offensive biological weapon programme.
• place controls on the transfer of sensitive technology by intangible means – such as by email or fax.
• provide for penalties for transfer violations to be imposed, increased or varied to reflect the seriousness of the offence.
• prescribe licensing procedures in respect of any of the controls imposed (consideration would need to be given as to whether a permissive system would be required or whether prior or retrospective notifications to government would suffice).
• enable changes to be made to the list of licensable items: additions and deletions in light of changing circumstances.

These licensing tasks could be made less daunting by creating an expedited licensing option, for example, for laboratories with particular internationally recognised expertise that regularly exchange cultures with specified laboratories in other States.