Report of the regional seminar for West and Central Africa
I. Introduction
The regional meeting in support of the universalisation of the
Eight States not party to the BTWC were represented: Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, and Liberia.
Seven regional States party to the BTWC attended: Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
Representatives from four International and Regional Organisations participated: World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), World Health Organisation (WHO), Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA).
Seven EU Member States were represented: Austria, Germany (Presidency), The Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the EU Institute for Security Studies.
II. Meeting proceeding
A. Introductions
Ambassador Doretta Maria Loschelder (Germany; Presidency of the European Union) welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU presidency, and introduced the goals of the European Union (EU) with regard to the disarmament and non-proliferation of biological weapons (BW). She underlined that this was the fourth of five such regional meetings to help universalising the BTWC, and the second in Africa.She emphasised that the Convention bans a whole category of WMD, and at the same time offers opportunities in international cooperation in the field of biotechnology, including the fight against communicable diseases. The 2006 Review Conference of the BTWC underlined the importance of promoting the multilateral process of implementing the BTWC through practical measures. She stated that the EU is dedicated to reaching these objectives, and that the present regional workshop contributes to the promotion of regional cooperation, as well as collaboration between the countries in the region, and their regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the EU.
Ms Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-proliferation, welcomed the participants on behalf of the EU Member States and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Mr Javier Solana, and thanked the German Ambassador, as well as the Senegalese authorities, for their assistance in organising this regional seminar.
The EU, she stressed, was increasingly assuming political responsibility for addressing the evolving security threats. When the EU heads of state adopted the EU security strategy, they also adopted a strategy to prevent WMD proliferation. The motivation for organising this regional seminar in support of the universalisation of the BTWC is deeply rooted in these EU Strategies. Both documents are based on three principles, namely effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation, and partnership.
She underlined that the EU is committed to strengthening multilateral systems, including the United Nations. Effective multilateralism is reflected in the EU’s political and financial contribution to efforts to universalise the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the BTWC, the Additional Protocol, etc.
The EU’s emphasis is on prevention. In doing so, the EU seeks to address the complexities and root causes of the threats. In the case of the BW threat, the EU contribution is multifaceted and combines many policy tools. The strengthening of the BTWC requires cooperation with other states and international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) in combatting diseases. Cooperation also needs to extend to areas like export controls of dual-use goods and technologies, and technical assistance with regard to border controls, training of customs officers, and similar practical measures.
A new tool used by the EU is the ‘non-proliferation clause’, which is inserted into all cooperation and association agreements with third countries as a confidence-building measure and an opportunity to engage in a wider security dialogue. This is consistent with UNSC Resolution 1540. Even if a state has never pursued BW, it should ensure that its ports, ships, airports, planes and other transportation hubs will not be used to traffic and transit sensitive biological agents. It should also implement security measures to deny access to pathogens and other harmful materials that could be abused by terrorists.
The EU also agreed on an Africa partnership strategy in December 2005, dealing with the comprehensive interaction between the EU and Africa. In the context of implementing the requirements of Article X of the BTWC, the fight against communicable diseases is one of the priorities in this strategy.
Momentum has been created by the 6th Review Conference of the BTWC to promote national implementation. The EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC signals both a financial commitment and a desire for action by the EU to promote BTWC universality as well as to improve its implementation. It has a double objective. First, it aims to raise awareness about the importance of BTWC universality. It encourages States that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to the convention. Second, the EU offers legal or legislative implementation assistance to States Parties that request it. It is the intention to solicit the EU Member States to expand this second component in order to be able to provide a similar type of assistance to countries that are in the process of ratifying or acceding to the BTWC.
Ambassador Cheikh Sylla, Ambassador of Senegal to Germany and representing the Foreign Minister of Senegal, next welcomed the participants. He expressed the appreciation of the government of Senegal to the EU for its commitment towards controlling the threat of WMD and its dedication to promote the objectives of the BTWC. This endeavour is to be particularly welcomed given that currently arms control appears to almost be a taboo issue. Two years ago, Heads of State had agreed on the priority issues that are before the international community—arms control and disarmament were not prominent among them. The EU commitment therefore is more than laudable.
Senegal also views the seminar as an EU acknowledgment of its efforts to promote the BTWC. It was one of the early signatory states and thereby demonstrated its commitment to the objectives of the treaty. The BTWC has fallen behind the CWC in recent years although it is some 22 years older. There is a need to address the reasons for this lag. National implementation of the BTWC involves a range of very technical issues. Many countries in Africa lack expertise in this regard. The EU’s assistance offer is therefore much appreciated; other assistance providers should be encouraged to do the same.
B. Summary of presentations
The first session dealt with regional security issues as related to the BTWC.Dr Gustav Lindstrom, Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute of Security Studies, emphasized that Europe views proliferation of WMD with particular concern and has therefore placed the issue high on its security agenda. The global threat requires a global response, but at the same time it is also intertwined with regional security matters. As regards biological weapons, he noted that the threat can be directed against humans, animals and plants. Furthermore, the threat involves not only agents, but also many technologies that have legitimate application, but can easily be misused for weapons purposes (the ‘dual-use technologies’). Infectious diseases do not stop at borders, which creates particular difficulties for surveillance and consequence management.
Although there are no known incidents of BW use in West and Central Africa, the region does suffer from a high prevalence of infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria, dengue, yellow fever). The BTWC offers opportunities for cooperation in this area, as well as in related areas of access to safe drinking water, lack of resources, and limited expertise to address these various issues.
An additional threat is the potential to use the region for transit or trafficking with malicious intent of harmful substances (including pathogens) or the dumping of toxic materials. Furthermore, States that are not Party to the BTWC often have weak legislation and consequently can become safe havens for criminals and terrorists (e.g., Al Qaeda is now active in the Maghreb and its training camps might be used for WMD training). Some of the pathogenic agents that are relatively easy to acquire from natural sources are prevalent in the region (a Japanese cult actually tried to isolate Ebola in Congo).
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project and entrusted with the technical implementation of the EU Joint Action, offered a brief summary of the BTWC and the status of the norm against BW. Worldwide, the BTWC has now 155 States Parties. Forty States still remain outside the convention. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is the most under-represented part of the world: out of a total of 47 States, only 28 (or 60 %) are party to the BTWC. He pointed to the prevalence in Central and Western Africa of communicable diseases, many of which were investigated for their utility as BW. The risk today is real: terrorist organisations have attempted to isolate BW agents (for example Ebola) from natural reservoirs, including in Africa.
African countries can clearly benefit from adhering to the BTWC: it creates additional security and enables participation in international/multilateral cooperation, including with regard to the protection against diseases as well as biological attacks. Development benefits can also be achieved through Article X of the convention by facilitating capacity building of public health system and promoting the underlying bio-research capability.
Discussion
Three themes dominated the discussion after the presentations: the verifiability of the BTWC, the determination whether the unnatural outbreak of a disease is deliberate or not, and the universalisation of the BTWC.
Ambassador Sylla noted the absence of a verification regime for the BTWC. In the light of the utility of biological agents in research, their threat really depends on intent. Verification could ensure that their use is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Dr Zanders agreed, but noted that a verification mechanism was not yet possible in the early seventies given the Cold War climate. He emphasised the importance of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which are not part of the treaty, but adopted at Review Conferences. CBMs create transparency to enhance confidence in the peaceful nature of States Parties’ activities in the biological field, but it is not verification. The representative of Liberia raised the related point of the absence of a secretariat and wondered how States Parties can be regularly updated on the state of affairs with regard to the operation of the BTWC. In response, Ms Giannella pointed to the decision of the 6th Review Conference to establish an implementation support unit (ISU) within the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. This is a small but significant beginning. The EU has started talking to the UN so as to develop strong cooperation with the ISU. Europe would be in favour of verification. However, the absence of a verification mechanism does not mean that the BTWC is not a strong instrument. The CBMs are an example of how the absence of a verification system can be counter-balanced. Dr Zanders added that the States Parties meet annually (at experts as well as diplomatic level), which creates an ongoing, lively and result-oriented debate. It was important to note that today biological weapons are totally delegitimized.
The representative of the Central African Republic inquired whether it is possible to detect the introduction into the region of biological agents as weapons. She expressed her concern about several new diseases emerging in the region (such as HIV/AIDS, which is now endemic) and the fact that they are rumoured to have been introduced deliberately. The representative of Gabon commended the EU on its initiative and echoed the concerns. On two occasions Gabon had occurrences of Ebola. It was important to know whether these incidents had been used by terrorists. The representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo too pointed to two cases of Ebola near the Equator where there remained questions as to the origin of the outbreaks. Dr Chu (WHO) explained that identifying the origin of a disease is not a straight-forward process. Diseases are endemic in many places—they may appear in specific areas and become associated with particular places or countries, but there may be other reservoirs in nature. This needs additional research. She noted that AIDS is a devastating disease with a high economic and health toll, but there is a need to work towards controlling it regardless of where it came from. She stated that samples of Ebola had been collected to analyse the causes of the incidents. Gabon’s research station, which is very experienced in such work, was involved in this process. Analysis of the collected strains in laboratories in other countries did not uncover evidence that Ebola had been used as a BW.
Ambassador Sylla picked up on the mention of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo’s attempts to collect pathogenic material from Africa. He inquired as to how that related to the application of export controls and whether the EU can help in this regard. Dr Lindstrom, in response, pointed to the challenges that such non-state actors would face with regard to weaponisation. Ms Giannella underscored the importance of export controls. However, they are highly technical, and require legislation as well as training. The EU has been developing an assistance program in this area for partner countries. The European Commission is in charge of this programme.
The representative of UEMOA returned to the universalisation issue. He stressed that political and strategic attention by the states in the region is required to bring it into the mainstream of regional politics. This is relevant both to the development and the military (security) context. Seven out of eight UEMOA Members are party to the BTWC, which demonstrates that the region recognises the importance of adherence to the BTWC. He concluded that the seminar will create opportunities to improve implementation from a technical/practical perspective (in such areas as legislation and administration).
The second session focussed on the BTWC provisions, their implementation and the ratification and accession processes.
Mr Daniel Feakes of the Harvard-Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons (HSP), University of Sussex (UK), elaborated on the BTWC’s core concepts and processes. He first explained the meaning of biological warfare and weapons according to Article I of the BTWC. After a brief history of the efforts to control biological warfare, he detailed the comprehensive scope of the prohibitions in the convention, which is based on the General Purpose Criterion (GPC). The GPC enables States Parties to deal with ‘dual-use’ questions while pursuing legitimate activities in fields of biology and biotechnologies.
He next turned to the 6th Review Conference (20 November–8 December 2006) and gave a detailed overview of the outcomes, including the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit and the emphasis given by States Parties to universalisation and national implementation. To support those efforts, States parties are now to designate a national contact point in order to facilitate interaction with the ISU and among themselves with regard to information sharing and assistance programmes. Mr Feakes concluded by reviewing the annual work agenda between 2007 and 2010 and the decision to hold the 7th Review Conference in 2011.
Mr Peter Emefiele, Secretary of the National Authority on Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions of Nigeria, presented his country’s experience with implementing the BTWC. Nigeria signed the BTWC on 10 July 1972 and ratified it one year later on 9 July 1973. In the light of the growing threat with biological agents it directed the National Authority, established under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to take on the additional responsibility for the BTWC in 2003, which was consequently re-designated the National Authority on Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. He next gave a detailed overview of the tasks and responsibilities of the National Authority and the initiatives undertaken by the Nigerian Government and Agencies to set up national implementation legislation, the promotion of regional initiatives on the implementation of the BTWC, and response mechanisms to disease outbreaks, and so on.
Dr Ralf Trapp, Legal Coordinator at the BioWeapons Prevention Project for possible assistance programmes under the EU Joint Action, summarized the obligations States Parties to the BTWC assume in order to translate the prohibitions in the convention into national legislation. He also highlighted the legal and legislative implementation assistance the EU can make available to States Party to the BTWC that request such assistance.
Discussion
The representative of Cote d’Ivoire explained that although the Executive had completed its part of the ratification process no progress has been possible in Parliament as a consequence of an internal political crisis. As a political settlement was approaching, he hoped that the adherence of his country to the BTWC would soon be possible.
The representative of Guinea explained that his country has initiated proceedings towards BTWC accession, including by measures to sensitise stakeholders. BTWC issues are lagging behind those of the CWC, partly because of a lack of awareness.
The representative of Chad agreed that adherence to the BTWC was in line with the objectives of other international treaties as well as counter-terrorism efforts. He hoped that the seminar would provide additional impetus towards his country’s ratification of the BTWC. However, Chad would benefit from other countries’ experiences regarding the identification of key national stakeholders. In response, Mr Emefiele explained that this was not an easy task. However, now that Nigeria had set up its National Authority for the CWC, and also mandated it to lead the efforts in the BTWC implementation field, things were moving ahead. Both the development and the security areas of national policy are central to the process, and all the relevant ministries and government agencies need to be involved. Ms Giannella added that EU implementation assistance under the current Joint Action (e.g., in the field of legislation) is limited to States Parties. Signatories cannot at this stage receive such assistance in preparation of their accession or ratification. This could, however, be reviewed in future Joint Actions.
The representative of Senegal underlined the significance of the Nigerian experience, and then pointed to the fact that in the area of small arms there have been positive experiences with regional networking. This could be a possible avenue to promote full regional adherence to the BTWC.
The representative of UEMOA stressed the importance of developing legislation as well as codes of conduct. Within a State, there is a collective responsibility to ensure compliance with the norms of the BTWC.
The representative of the Central African Republic stressed that the regional workshop was useful and met expectations. The country now needs support and assistance so as to urge its government authorities to join the process of BTWC accession. A committee must be formed to develop a ratification proposal for submission to parliament.
The representative of Gabon also explained that his country is eager to demonstrate its commitment to disarmament. Gabon now has set up a National Authority for the CWC. It has not yet ratified the BTWC because the convention has not yet received the necessary priority and visibility. Gabon would be working hard towards early ratification of the BTWC, however.
The representative of Angola remarked that Angola was not a member of either the CWC or the BTWC. There continued to be a need to further sensitise it to the need of why these steps are desirable. In principle, Angola has the intention to accede, provided it obtains concrete guarantees that it will be provided with assistance.
The representative of Togo informed the meeting that his country needs to set up a National Authority. Togo needs support in that process and expected positive feedback from the seminar. A National Committee to control proliferation of small arms has already been set up. Togo needed support, however, to sensitise its local populations. Ms Giannella explained that this was outside the scope of the EUJA, but she did not rule out possible support in the future, in a different context: The EU has developed a strategy against the trafficking and accumulation of small arms, which may well create opportunities to address the issue posed by Togo.
Ms Giannella, in summing up this part of the discussions, concluded that the intensive and thoughtful discussion was an indication of an increasing awareness in the region about the BTWC, and of a desire to join the treaty regime. She acknowledged the expressed need for additional assistance to States that are preparing to join the BTWC.
The first afternoon session placed the BTWC in the broader context of public health and disease surveillance.
Dr Gideon Brückner, Head of the Scientific and Technical Department of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), discussed issues related to the control over trans-boundary diseases, using animal disease outbreaks as his example. Besides the fact that animal and plant pathogens can cause great economic harm, some 60% of animal pathogens can transfer to humans (zoonosis). About 75% of emerging diseases can jump from animal to man. 80% of agents having a potential bioterrorist application are zoonotic pathogens. Most human diseases originate from animal sources.
International travel and commerce means that diseases cross borders and move easily across the globe. Through agro-terrorism pathogens can be deliberately introduced into a given region and has the potential for economic disasters. This knowledge calls for effective export and import controls in order to limit the potential spread of diseases and the development of veterinary services. Furthermore, there is a distinct need for early warning, detection and notification. The OIE provides training and assistance for capacity building in this area, and works in partnership with other international organs, including the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the WHO. With the FAO and the WHO the OIE is setting up a joint early warning system. The OIE actively supports BTWC.
Dr May Chu, BioRisk Reduction of Dangerous Pathogens at the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response of the World Health Organisation (WHO), discussed the contribution that biosafety and biosecurity can make to public health. She explained the mandate of WHO related to public health responses to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons as well as public health emergencies. The 2007 World Health Day focussed on international health security. She then elaborated on the role of the International Health Regulations that were adopted in 2005, which set new standards for all WHO Member States (in force 2007; by 2012 all Member States should have core capacity in place to implement the IHR). The IHR creates a framework/mechanism for reporting of outbreaks, for assistance if requested and for capacity development when needed. The objective is to contain the outbreak and reduce the time for emergency response. It is important to recognise that outbreaks and disease spread across today’s transportation systems (ports, airports, etc.).
She then described briefly the WHO’s outbreak response mechanism, which involves information gathering, verification, risk assessment, and, if agreed, the provision of in-country assistance. 1200 outbreak events have been recorded in recent years, many in Sub-Saharan Africa. WHO prepares guidelines, specific for diseases, and provides guidance documents related to global pandemic preparedness. It also offers advice on public health preparedness including for dealing with BW threats. From the WHO’s perspective, the public health response needs to deal with any incident, whether natural or malicious.
In addition, WHO has developed laboratory biosafety and biosecurity guidelines. There remains a need to raise awareness in the scientific community regarding dual-use issues relating to the manipulation of pathogens.
Discussion
In the subsequent discussion, both presentations were welcomed as very informative, and relevant to the problems of the region. They had provided additional rationale with regard to the need to adhere to the BTWC.
The second afternoon session investigated the benefits of biotechnology, but also looked and its challenges and the responsibilities it entails.
Dr Ralf Trapp highlighted the benefits biotechnology can bring with regard to new pharmaceuticals, advances in medicine, agriculture, materials and computing. However, these same advances applied in the military sphere can also contribute to the development of effective designer BW. In addition, since more people in a growing number of disciplines have access to the knowledge and expertise, the risk of misuse of biotechnology also increases. It has become a matter of urgency to understand this risk, and develop ways of dealing with it. The provisions of the BTWC offers a number of tools to reduce the risk of misuse while promoting the legitimate application of biotechnology. As the UN Secretary-General stated in April 2006, ‘the proper antidote to biological weapons threats is the Biological Weapons Convention’.
Mr Cheikh Christophe Gueye, Director of the Cabinet of the Minister for Scientific Research, Senegal, described the biotechnology programmes and biosecurity policy in Senegal. In particular, he discussed efforts to assess and manage risks associated with the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), for example, as new crops. Issues that he addressed in some detail included the need for comprehensive information before decisions are taken, the economic and social impact of such decisions, the high speed with which the introduction of GMOs is progressing and the environmental and other risks associated with that process. He explained that Senegal is taking a cautious, gradual approach to the issues, monitoring the environmental risks and preparing the necessary legislative basis for the introduction of GMOs. It is building up a monitoring mechanism to assess the risk of GMOs. The public has been involved in this process and surveys of local populations have been conducted. He then described the existing regulatory framework and system of oversight. Finally, he stressed the need for regional collaboration, and made reference to harmonisation efforts and the plan on biosecurity that has been developed within the ECOWAS framework. In the subsequent discussion, he further clarified and elaborated on some of these mechanisms, including the involvement of civil society as well as the availability of expert advice.
Discussion
Ambassador Sylla wanted to know more about the ‘experiments of concern’ that were discussed at the 2006 BTWC Review Conference. In this context, attention was drawn to the dual-use nature of bioresearch and biotechnology. While many of these research directions have perfectly legitimate justifications and objectives, some research has the potential of increasing the risks that could lead to new BW, and there are also a few types of experiments that have hardly any justification but would be highly dangerous from a BW perspective. He also asked for examples of existing laws in the region. Examples include Mali, which has mechanism to assess GMO risks, and Burkina Faso, which has a provisional decree in force. In Nigeria a bill is before the National Assembly, but earlier developed guidelines are already in use.
UEMOA pointed out that there is a regional economic approach, which includes biodiversity. A related regional workshop has already been conducted and standards in a regional directive are being discussed.
In the third and final session of the afternoon, a number of practical problems relating to the implementation of the BTWC were reviewed.
Dr Volker Beck, Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of Germany, introduced the subject of BTWC implementation by discussing EU approaches to disease surveillance, detection and response, as part of the EU strategy for bio-threat preparedness and response. The EU has set up several programmes, systems and networks to deal with epidemiological events or cases of the deliberate uses of chemical or biological agents. Since May 2005 the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is operational. The EU runs a Programme of Cooperation in Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Public Health). The European Commission also supports a number of research programmes to develop technologies and knowledge related to health security. Work is still very much in progress. The work plan for 2007 looks at cross-border movements and physical protection of material; risk associated with tourism and travel, and the traceability of individual passengers in the case of a major disease outbreak. Of importance is that no single EU Member has all the capabilities to address the risks and threats, which emphasizes the need for networking.
Dr Godwin Ogbadu, Director of the Biotechnology Advance Laboratory, Sheda Science and Technology Complex in Abuja, Nigeria, discussed how to monitor and control the possession and transfer of pathogens. Forms of monitoring may include declarations, random transparency visits, consultation procedures and challenge visits. The agents can be categorised into different risk groups (1 through 4), which correspond with the biosafety levels. There is a need to develop lists of high risk agents that are actually used in country. Parameters for assessing the nature of the work also need to be introduced.
Nigeria requires registration and there is an obligation to apply for permits to operate a licensed facility. Furthermore, declarations need to be submitted on the uses of pathogens. Inspections are conducted and the facilities must keep inventories of all cultures.
Shippers and recipients of pathogens must also submit declarations. The regulations relate to the administration, packaging, labelling, technical procedures and conditions for storage and transport, etc. There is a ban on unlicensed exports and imports. In addition, a protocol for intra-facility transfers has been introduced. It relates to access control measures and separation of areas to enable access control, security and protection. Personnel are subject to screening. Security policies need to be and are developed based on site-specific assessments.
Discussion
Dr Zanders reiterated the recognition that one size does not fit all. To develop national implementation measures takes time and needs pre-planning; cooperation and networking. Dr Beck addressed registration and licensing of facilities and pointed out that that depended on legal system. In some legal systems one cannot license a facility as such, but only an individual who is working with select agents. Liability is one of the issues that may lead to such solutions.
Dr Ogbadu also brought up the question of how to handle practices of scientists going to symposia and exchanging samples, thus bypassing any controls. That still happens, and is not subject to monitoring.
The representative of Angola asked clarification with regard to the anticipated controls of transports of pathogens and passenger traceability in the EU 2007 work plan. The concern was whether this would impact on human rights and the free movement of people. Dr Beck explained that this has to be seen in a public health context and not as a measure of law enforcement. Human rights issues were not affected. If there was a suspicion of a deliberate release, the circumstances would change and the case would have to be pursued as a law enforcement issue. Dr Chu pointed to the existing international regulations governing the transportation of substances across borders. UN regulations exist, including for airline transportation. She mentioned in that context the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations. International regulations exist for labelling and packaging of such materials, which need to be implemented nationally. As for the tracing of passengers, human rights issues may come up in case of very large outbreaks (isolation, quarantines) or when law enforcement issues get involved.
A representative of Nigeria wanted to know how effective the mechanism for reporting of shipments of select agents (in Nigeria) actually was. Dr Ogbadu assured her that one cannot ship them without a permit, and added that new protocols for customs services were being developed.
The representative of Angola raised concerns about a possible conflict between licensing of imports of agents and the free movement of goods, as the licensing could be interpreted as a measure to restrict trade. Dr Ogbadu clarified that those who trade in micro-organisms simply have to follow the regulations and get a permit, which applies to all such entities in Nigeria. Dr Beck added that the procedures may differ from country to country. Some countries only allow exchanges between licensed persons and require reporting (except for agents that are on an export control list, which require a different license and end-use certificates). He also pointed out that there are import prohibitions, e.g. for transfers of certain plant micro-organisms or animal pathogens.
Dr Zanders pointed to the relationship between penal laws and the CBMs under the BTWC, and explained that licensing could help in identifying what was going on at facilities in the country. In summing up the debate of the first days, he pointed to the synergism between the requirements in areas such as public health, animal health and crop protection, and measures that are needed to implement the requirements of the BTWC.
In the evening Ambassador Doretta Maria Loschelder (Germany; Presidency of the European Union) hosted a reception, which enabled the seminar participants to continue their discussions in an informal setting.
C. Workgroups
On the second day participants broke up in two working groups to discuss in detail three themes introduced during the previous afternoon, namely ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’, ‘Obligations under the BTWC and UNSC 1540: International Cooperation and Assistance’, and ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’.Theme 1: ‘Biology and biotechnology: development benefits and responsibility’
Most of the West and Central African States have some biotechnology activities relating to plant, food and medical products. These activities are not yet highly developed in most cases, but there is a realisation that this situation may change in the future. In those countries where biotechnologies are being applied, the need to address regulation and review the use of biotechnology has arisen.
The participants from States not yet party to the BTWC have limited knowledge about the biotechnology activities taking place in their country or cited specific work undertaken by their respective Ministries of Agriculture or in certain universities. They were generally not knowledgeable about who has scientific responsibility for biotechnology activities or biosafety, although for most countries the ministry that heads science and education appears to have a certain role. In most cases there is no specific agency responsible for oversight. The countries generally expressed interest in the formation of a coordinated system to oversee and review biotechnology and biosafety activities.
UEMOA suggested that a mechanism of sub-regional and regional partnerships to deal with biosafety and biosecurity issues could benefit the capacity to oversee those activities.
Theme 2: ‘Regional security issues and the BTWC’
The participants identified as main threats poverty and natural diseases, such as cholera, meningitis, HIV/AIDS and malaria. The situation is made worse by poor hygiene, lack of healthcare, clean water, etc. States mostly enjoy good relations with neighbouring countries, so there is little perception of a threat resulting from other states using BW. The terrorist use of BW against regional states is not especially likely, but there is the problem of terrorists using regional countries as a ‘safe haven’ or as a transit point. The dumping of toxic waste from other countries and the inability to identify its origin is seen as a major issue that has recently become very acute.
Participants appreciated that while free trade agreements aim to promote the free circulation of goods, there is still a need to enhance border security in order to control cross-border traffic and establish control procedures at airports and seaports. They were conscious that many countries in the region have long land borders that remain unsupervised. Furthermore, customs and immigration personnel are not trained to detect biological agents and they lack appropriate equipment at border crossings. With regard to disease outbreaks, there is equally a lack of regional capacities for detection and diagnosis and to understand spread of diseases. Of critical importance to citizens is the protection of the food chain and water supply.
Common to all States in the region is the need for capacity-building and technical assistance in the following areas:
• The development of local capacity to distinguish between natural and unusual outbreaks of disease as many outbreaks initially look suspicious.
• Technical assistance with border security, capacity-building for customs and immigration personnel, technology transfer from developed countries in terms of border detection equipment.
• Participants felt that international assistance from the EU and others should be available to States not party to the BTWC as well as States Parties.
Theme 3: ‘Ratification and accession to the BTWC: Legal and administrative requirements’
Two broad issues, namely motivation to adhere and the mechanics of joining the BTWC, were central to the discussions.
There are many expectations for benefits resulting from adherence to the BTWC. This includes assistance, which may touch upon certain areas not specifically covered by the convention. These expectations are important to motivate high-level decision makers.
Being a Party to the BTWC also signals a firm commitment to contribute to the resolution of a global security issue. This forms part of a broader commitment to common goals and objectives of the international community. Even though in West and Central Africa BW are not seen as an acute security issue, which has consequently received low priority, this commitment to common security is of overriding importance and should be used to mobilise States to join the BTWC.
The participants appreciated that multiple stakeholders are involved in the process of ratifying or acceding to the BTWC. They include a range of government agencies and ministries (e.g., foreign affairs, defence, health, science and education, agriculture, animal welfare, environment, etc). They in turn need to work with their respective constituencies.
Ratification/accession therefore takes time and is a complex process, which is specific for each State. Nevertheless, certain commonalities exist. It is of central importance to sensitise governments at the beginning of the process of the needs and benefits, so as to ensure support for the preparation of ratification/accession documents. Advice from the EU should focus not on how to accomplish these goals, but on what needs to be done.
Following the plenary presentation of the Workgroup reports, Dr Gustav Lindstrom drew attention to three important issues that permeated the discussions:
• The importance of building awareness, including of the benefits of joining the BTWC;
• A recognition of the limited resources in the region; and
• Recognition of benefits that would be accrued after joining the BTWC, and in areas beyond BTWC.
D. Concluding session
Mr Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), expressed his pleasure about the broad participation of African countries at the seminar. He recalled the horrors of World War I, in which both chemical and biological weapons were used. Since then the international community has tried to prevent the recurrence of biological and toxin warfare, resulting in the BTWC. Since 1972 the BTWC has not lost any of its relevance: while the advances in science and technology offer many prospects, there is also the need to address the dangers, including that posed by terrorism.The BTWC may be a strange issue in Africa, where small arms pose a significant threat and where there is no real BW threat. However, he cautioned that WMD cannot be contained in one place: they proliferate or can be targeted against populations in regions where they do not exist. For this reason the BTWC is also relevant for the survival of populations in Africa. However, there is a need to increase the involvement of stakeholders to promote the BTWC. The CWC demonstrates that success is possible and can be lasting.
Mr Ould-Abdallah reminded the participants that many African States must be encouraged to join the convention. He also pointed out the challenges relating to the domestication of the BTWC. African States that have not yet adopted national legislation should be encouraged to move forward. There is a shortage of capacity in Africa and the EU is a partner to help addressing this issue.
Mr Emmanuel Moïse, Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of the Armed Forces, Senegal, thanked the participants for coming here, and the EU for organising this 2nd meeting in Africa. He noted that the recommendations should not be limited to the military arena. They also apply to the various fields handling biological agents. As regards the adoption of internal systems to oversee biological agents and effective control measures for their transfer and handling, he proposed a cooperation model to counter international terrorism and control access to pathogens with assistance from the EU.
The transmission of diseases through animals and plants remains a concern. This could be exploited by terrorists, which is an urgent reason to move towards universalisation of BTWC. Mr Moïse stated that the BTWC is not yet fully effective as many States have not yet adopted the Convention. He viewed that the regional seminar for West and Central Africa has been a major opportunity to correct this problem.
The proper implementation of the convention is absolutely urgent as the region could be deprived of the benefits from biotechnology research. Despite the low threat level of BW use in Africa, there is a need to encourage African countries to ratify or accede to the convention with support from the EU. Joining the convention also fosters peace in Africa.
Ambassador Gilles Hervio, Head of the European Commission Delegation to Senegal spoke on behalf of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. He initially thought that the BTWC seemed a strange subject for a meeting in Senegal, which never possessed or wanted to acquire BW. However, given the terrorist dimension of BW threat and the need to control the transfer of pathogens and other technologies that might contribute to the acquisition and use of BW, the seminar was more than appropriate. He recalled the original purpose of the meeting, namely to promote accession to and ratification of the BTWC, a priority set by the 6th Review Conference. Africa in particular still has a large number of States not yet party to the convention. The seminar provided a framework to discuss the reasons for this situation. At the same time, the different types of advantages of joining have also been explored. Many countries will benefit from EU assistance. However, the seminar also helped the EU to understand the shortcomings of its assistance package on offer. This will be rectified. Establishing networks and contacts was another important outcome, which will contribute to new collaborations. The meeting was also in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which encourages States to contribute as well as cooperate with each other in the area of non-proliferation.
Dr Zanders thanked Senegal for co-hosting and supporting the organisation of this meeting and for its continued universalisation efforts. He also reminded participants from regional States party to the BTWC of the national implementation assistance offered by the EU under the Joint Action and the procedure to request such assistance.
The representative of Liberia requested the floor to express gratitude on behalf of West and Central African delegations and appreciation to EU Council for organising this seminar at a time when terrorism is becoming an increasing concern. He assured that the States not yet party will make all efforts to complete ratification or accession proceedings and to transpose the BTWC into national legislation. He also thanked the Senegalese government for its hospitality.